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Introduction - Perma.cc, Linkrot, Archiving, and Copyright

Perma.cc offers the solution to linkrot—the phenomenon that citations in academic journals to
web materials disappears with the passage of time, resulting in “broken links”. According to Perma.cc’s
own website, 70% of all links published between 1999 and 2011 are broken.2 Perma.cc solves this
problem by letting scholars load web materials cited in their papers to an online archive and by providing
a permanent URL known as a “Perma.cc link.”3 As an example, Perma.cc preserves the FBI’s Top Ten
Most Wanted List at a given moment in time. A scholar may want to archive the site as of a given date
and can do so with the Perma.cc link to https://perma.cc/T8U2-994F.4 The web page stored is
interactive,5 although a screenshot version is also available. Besides web pages, encoded in HTML, there
is no reason why other types of file types such as PDFs, MS Word documents, spreadsheets, PowerPoints,
video files cannot be stored if they were linked to the Web.6
2

About Perma.cc, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/docs#what-is-link-rot (last visited May 22, 2020).

3

Id. at https://perma.cc/docs#how-does-perma-work.

4

Described at Perma.cc user guide/Getting Started, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/docs#how-does-permawork (last visited May 22, 2020).
5

The “capture” format uses Web ARChive (or “warc”). See Web ARChive, Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_ARChive (last visited May 22, 2022). It is widely used in web harvesting and
“web crawls.” Id. The screenshot version is a PNG file. See Perma.cc user guide Perma Records & Links,
Perma.cc, https://perma.cc/docs/perma-link-creation#preservation-formats (last visited May 22, 2020).
6

An email from Adam Ziegler of Harvard’s Library Innovation Lab suggests different file types can be
archived although video can be tricky.
When a user directs Perma to try to archive something that's publicly available on the web, our software
goes to the given URL and tries to archive what's there whether it's simple HTML, a hosted PDF, DOCx,
video, etc. For example, many users want to preserve government reports that are available on the web as
PDFs. Likewise with other types of materials online. We try to support that to the extent the technology
allows (video preservation, for one, is often tricky).

2

Perma.cc is not just about any kind of archiving. Its fundamental use is indefinite preservation of
an otherwise perishable resource for scholarly purposes. Although the risk of suit, or even a takedown
notice appears to be low, copyright law is fundamentally dissonant with archival practices. Regardless of
risk, there are instances when copyright should be considered prior to archiving. Especially concerning
might be blogs, articles on news’ sites, and scholarly and professional papers, articles and books in pdf
form that do not grant permission for copying.
This article will describe Perma.cc and outline the kinds of copyright issues that may arise,
including heavy use of copyright statutes and caselaw. It will examine that kind of preservation use of
copyrighted materials with reference to fair use and the library prerogatives as exceptions to the exclusive
rights of authors of materials found on the Web. This analysis includes detailed analysis of
“transformative use” and the four factors of 17 U.S.C. § 107. It will consider the liability of Perma.cc and
participating libraries and institutions under theories of contributory infringement and vicarious liability,
including as modified by 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), governing takedown notices. It observes that frustration
with the notice-and-takedown scheme has resulted in a recent, popular legislation, which was passed as
part of the Appropriations Bill at the end of 2020 providing relief for COVID-19.7 This legislation
provides for an alternative to notice-and-takedown notices with a Copyright Small Claims Board.
The article concludes that Perma.cc’s archival use is neither firmly grounded in existing fair use
nor library exemptions, that Perma.cc, its “registrar” library and institutional affiliates, and its
contributors have some (at least theoretical) exposure to risk, and that current copyright doctrines and law
do not adequately address archival storage for scholarly purposes. In doing so, it will question what the
role of the scholarly Perma.cc citation ought to play—confirmation of scholarly propositions or
preservation of and access to web materials. The material and conclusions in this article are important for
legal authors, law review editors, and librarians (especially those who use, support, or are considering
partnering with Perma.cc); so that they might better assess copyright compliance, especially when
selecting materials for archiving, such as articles from news sites, blogs, and professional and scholarly
papers, articles or books.8
A.

Perma.cc and Terms of Service

To understand the obligations of the parties under Perma.cc’s Terms of Service, it is necessary to
understand that there are three parties involved in most transactions—submitting scholars, registrar
libraries,9 or organizations, and Perma.cc. All of them share some risk for infringing contributions to
E-mail from Adam Ziegler, Director, Library Innovation Lab, Harvard Law School Library, to author (Apr. 17,
2020, 12:58 pm CST) (on file with author). Indeed, I was able to get a Perma.cc link for Paul Callister, Searching
Westlaw Case for Transformative Use (Dec. 11, 2019) (movie file),
https://mediasite.law.umkc.edu/Mediasite/Play/2250f39002d94c57ac1b94a8072618681d, archived at
https://perma.cc/U8SN-WLRV. However, the video only played initially and will no longer play.
7

See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. (2020) (enacted). Title II, Subtitle, A,
Chapter 15-Copyright Small Claims of the Act, including §§ 1501-1511 covers the creation, claims and procedures
for a Copyright Claims Board. Libraries may “preempt out” of the Small Claims Board proceedings. See id. at Title
II, Chapter, 15, § 1506(aa)
8

In reviewing an earlier draft of this paper, Perma.cc believes the copyright risks to be extremely low and
was in fundamental disagreement with the suggestion of risk in an earlier, draft of the paper. Copy of review is on
file with author. While now deemphasizing risk, I have proceeded with this article to highlight the dissonance of
copyright law and archiving web materials.
9

Registrars may add another party, organizations such as law reviews or research groups. See Perma.cc
user guide/For Registrars, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/docs/libraries (lasted visited June 11, 2020).

3

Perma.cc’s archive. Without the scholar’s home libraries affiliating themselves with Perma.cc by
becoming registrars, it is only possible to get an individual membership, with ten free links, and
thereafter, a mandatory subscription.10 Non-academic institutions can become registrars, but they also
have subscription fees.11

Figure 1-Chart Depicting Types of Membership and Subscriptions

1.

User and Library Obligations and Indemnification

Both scholarly contributors (users) and library (and other institutional) registrars agree to respect
the copyright of others and to indemnify Perma.cc for liability.12 Library and other registrars must see
that their users “do not abuse their accounts.”13 Section 2.(a) of the Terms of Services (applying to both
users and library registrars) reads: “You may use the Site and Service, including content stored at the

10

See About Perma.cc, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/about#accounts (last visited May 22, 2020).
Subscription prices are tiered—to links for $10.00 a month, 100 links for $25.00 a month, and 500 links for $100.00
a month. See Settings, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/settings/subscription (last visited June 1, 2020).
11

See About Perma.cc, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/about#accounts (last visited May 22, 2020).

12

Registrars play a role in administering Perma.cc services with the registrar’s “network” of users. They
are the main point of contact for questions about Perma.cc. They are responsible for ensuring that network users “do
not abuse their accounts.” Perma.cc, Perma.cc user guide/For Registrars, https://perma.cc/docs/libraries (last visited
May 6, 2020). Registers are also bound by Perma.cc’s Terms of Service. See Perma.cc, Perma.cc for libraries,
https://perma.cc/libraries (last visited May 6, 2020) (“By registering [as a library registrar], you agree to the terms of
service.”).
13

See Perma.cc user guide/For Registrars, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/docs/libraries#libraries-authority
(last visited May 22, 2020).
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direction of users, only for non-commercial scholarly, research, reporting, criticism and commenting
purposes that do not infringe or violate anyone’s copyright or other rights.”14 Furthermore, the users
make contributions to Perma.cc at their own risk.15 Users and registrar libraries warrant that “Submitted
Content both (1) is freely available on the Internet to the general public . . . and (2) is cited in a legal
work or in a work of scholarship, reporting, criticism or commentary.”16 The “Submitted Content” must
be lawfully acquired, users must have all the necessary rights to store the content, and the content must
not “infringe or violate copyrights.”17 The users and registrars even grant a nonexclusive sublicense to
Perma.cc to “to use, reproduce, create derivative works based upon, transmit, distribute, perform, display,
and make available the User Submitted Content,18 in any medium now in existence or later developed, in
connection with the Service or otherwise in furtherance of our mission, including but not limited to
promotional uses.”19 Finally, users and library registrars agree to indemnify Perma.cc:
You agree to indemnify and hold harmless us, our affiliates, governing board members, officers,
employees, agents and representatives, and any party with whom we may contract to provide the
Service, from and against any claims, liabilities, losses, damages, costs and expenses, including
but not limited to reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs, arising out of or in any way
connected to your use of the Site or Service, including but not limited to any allegation or claim
that, if true, reflects your violation of these Terms of Service or the infringement or violation by
you (or occurring through use of your account) of any intellectual property or other right of any
person or entity.20
Every item of submitted content from the end user is a risk, for him or her, and his or her host registrar
institution. If there were no risk, why would Perma.cc bother with an indemnification clause?
2.

Governmental Library Registrars and Immunity from Suit

Legal counsel from my own host institution (a state university) refuses to agree to let my law
library become a registrar because the indemnification clause does not provide that state sponsored
institutions may be free from law suit under the Amendment XI of the Constitution (and should be free
from indemnifications for suits exempted by the Constitution). Current law on the immunity of states,
and their respective agencies, from copyright infringement is a constantly evolving quagmire that is best
left to university counsel.21 However, by accepting the indemnification clause as is, a state school library
registrar may effectively waive its Amendment XI protections from liability, at least with respect to
14

Perma Terms of Service, PERMA.CC, effective Jan. 22, 2019, https://perma.cc/terms-of-service.

15

Id. at § 4.

16

Id. at § 5(a)(i). In spite of the “freely available” requirement, paradoxically, pages with a “noarchive”
metatag are still stored by Perma.cc, but by default, in a folder only accessible to the user and his or her
organization. See Perma.cc user guide: Perma Records & Links, Perma.cc, https://perma.cc/docs/perma-linkcreation#private-records (last visited May 19, 2020).
17

Perma Terms of Service, PERMA.CC, supra note 14, at § 5(a)(ii)-(iv).

18

“User Submitted Content” is defined in id. at § 5(a). It is basically what the user directs Perma.cc to

19

Id. at § 5(c).

20

Id. at § 8 (emphasis added).

store.

21

See DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01 (Matthew Bender 2019). “One of the few
constants, however, in the ‘complex, often contradictory, and in some cases baffling’ Supreme Court
pronouncements about the Eleventh Amendment is that it is seldom, if ever, taken literally. See id. at [E][2][b].
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indemnifying Perma.cc. Thus, without going any further into copyright risks, state school libraries should
hesitate to enter into Perma.cc registrar agreements, at least under their terms for indemnification as of
this writing.
B.

Illustration and Nature Problem

Some may wonder if this is an article in search of problem. It is not. Much online archival
activity is dissonant with current law although there is almost no litigation over the issue, and the
common remedy is a takedown request. However, a real problem stems from lack of copyright owner
authorization for archiving and the lack of protections for Perma.cc library and institutional registrars and
end users. It is compounded by lack of clear copyright defenses for archival uses.
To illustrate concern, without my asking, the editors at Law Library Journal added 50 Perma.cc
links to web materials cited in my recent article, Law, Artificial Intelligence, and Natural Language
Processing: A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to My Search Results. Most of which were articles I
cited were already archived elsewhere.22 Law Library Journal editors, whom I greatly admire for their
diligent work and expertise, nonetheless uploaded all of my citations to Web materials to Perma.cc,
regardless of licensing and placed corresponding links in my article. The issue is care and thoughtfulness
with respect to copyright in using the Perma.cc archive. Ultimately, I chose to have the links removed.
For instance, in the article,23 I cited to “DANIEL JURAFSKY & JAMES H. MARTIN, Vector
Semantics, in SPEECH AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING 11-12 (3d ed., draft Sept. 23, 2018),
https://web.stanford.edu/~jurafsky/slp3/6.pdf.” Now this book chapter is revised from earlier print,
published, print editions of the same book. Currently, the draft of the third edition of the draft is available
for viewing. It is possible that the chapter will remain indefinitely available on the Web, or the author
might place the new edition with a print publisher and, either by choice or instruction of the publisher,
remove draft versions from the Web. Perhaps an eBook will even be available, but behind a paywall.24
Naturally, my desire would be to use a Perma.cc link to preserve access to the all of my citations
on to web materials, but I would wager that if I archive copyrighted content that simply is not a website
(such as Weather.com), there is a much higher risk that the owner may seek redress for infringing on
copyright, or at least demand that materials be taken down from the archive. In particular, news articles,
blogs, and professional and scholarly publications may trigger objections of the owner.25 In my same
article, besides websites, I cite to many articles, papers, and even videos that are available for free on the
Internet. Admittedly, some of the articles are already in scholarly archives, and placement in Perma.cc
would be redundant. Some articles may grant permission for copying. However, if they are all
unquestioningly preserved by and linked to Perma.cc, there is heighted risk of objection by owners. Yet
at the same time, I want my citations to be available in perpetuity and to avoid embarrassing and
annoying broken links.

22

Paul D. Callister, Law, Artificial Intelligence, and Natural Language Processing: A Funny Thing
Happened on the Way to My Search Results, 112 LAW LIBR. J. 161, (2020), https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/dw29y.
23

See id. at 174, n. 58.

24

“A paywall is a method of restricting access to content via a purchase or paid subscription.” Paywall,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paywall (last visited May 22, 2020).
25

Certainly, many authors license their materials for re-use using licensing such as the Creative Commons
provides. See Share Your Work, Creative Commons, https://creativecommons.org/share-your-work/ (last visited
Oct. 5, 2020). These may be archived according to the term set by the Creative Commons license

6

In another instance, in June of 2019, I referred in a presentation to a free ABA website for a
compilation of ABA Ethics Opinions on attorney use of the “cloud,” but in June of 2020 that web link is
broken, and is available behind a paywall. 26

Figure 2--Illustration of ABA Paywall

Another troubling scenario is news blogs or services that have their own subscription archives, but allow
free access for a monthly “peek” at a defined number of articles.27 Other news sites may make current
headlines available, but archive older articles, which can only be accessed with a subscription. 28 Thus,
news articles are eventually moved behind a paywall. Users might successfully submit such news articles
to Perma.cc, not realizing they have bypassed the access protocols put in place by news organizations.29
Even if the submitted site page has a “noarchive” metatag, Perma.cc will still archive the page, but by

26

The broken link is to
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/resources/charts_fyis/cloudethics-chart.html. The material is still available, but behind a paywall. See Final, Cloud-Based Ethics Opinions
2019, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/digital-assetabstract.html/content/dam/aba/images/legal_technology_resources/CloudEthicsOpinions2019/cloudethicsopinions20
19.pdf (last visited June 10, 2020).
27
For example, online news sites with free views of a specified articles each month. The objective of these
“teasers” is to induce viewers to sign up for subscriptions. The New York Times, Washington Post, and Wired all
do this. Theoretically, it should be possible for such pages from such sites to be archived in Perma.cc if the number
of “free” views by Perma.cc had not been exceeded.
28
The Kansas City Star used to do this, and essentially does so now by only offering teaser, headline
articles. See https://www.kansascity.com/.
29

For instance, using my individual account (using up one of my free 10 Perma.cc links), I linked a news
story, Pamela Samuelson, The US Copyright Office Section 512 Study: Why the Entertainment Industry is Claiming
Victory, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG, May 25, 2020, http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/05/25/the-uscopyright-office-section-512-study-why-the-entertainment-industry-is-claimingvictory/?doing_wp_cron=1590520010.7674450874328613281250, archived at https://perma.cc/ATV3-PZGZ. I
took this precaution and as an experiment because my experience is that free Kluwer news articles disappear after a
time.

7

default the page “is accessible only to the individual account, organization and registrar responsible for
the Perma Record.”30 That default can be changed, however, by users and their organizations.31
What form will redress for copyright infringement take? Most likely copyright owners will
pursue the notice-and-takedown remedy offered as part of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).32 But, although seldom
used,33 copyright owners may seek other remedies against Perma.cc and perhaps registrars under § 512(c)
based upon theories of contributory infringement and vicarious liability.34 They may also sue end users
for infringement under § 501 and the following sections.35 Furthermore, even if plaintiffs utilize the
notice-and-takedown provisions of § 512(c), the provisions only protect “service providers,” which would
be Perma.cc, and might not include library or other registrars, who have no role in Perma.cc’s notice-andtakedown process.36 Not being responsible for answering to § 512(c), it is unlikely that the protections
afforded in the section would protect registrar libraries and institutions. More concretely, notice-andtakedown provisions do not protect end users of Perma.cc.37
The nature of the problems is that web materials are copyrighted works that may transition from
not only being available to unavailable on the Web, but that they have never been or do become
unauthorized for copying into an archive. Most critically, authorized use probably may not include
archiving. The financial forces driving publication of scholarly and news materials may push what was
once freely available behind pay walls.38 Ideally, every contributing user to Perma.cc would get
30

See Perma.cc user guide: Perma Records & Links, Perma.cc, https://perma.cc/docs/perma-linkcreation#private-records (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
31

See id.

32

See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(C), (c)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-152).

33

See infra section V.A.1.

34

See infra section V.

35

See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-504 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-152).

36

See Perma.cc user guide/For Registrars, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/docs/libraries#libraries-authority
(last visited May 22, 2020) (registrar libraries are the main point of contact between Perma.cc and end users, remove
users and ensure that “those in [their] network do not abuse their account,” but there is nothing about DMCA
required notices or takedown procedures, which seem to be the sole responsibility of Perma.cc).
37

See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-152) (definition of “service provider”
covered by the section). This issue is explored in more depth in below. See text accompanying infra notes 225
through 226. The effect of § 512(d), which parallels §512(c), but with respect to hyperlinking rather than archiving,
is also discussed in the context of electronic law reviews and journals with Perma.cc hyperlinks. See infra notes 228
through 233 and accompanying text.
38

See Lindsey Ellefson, Fortune Begins Moving Its Stories Behind Digital Paywall, THE WRAP, Jan. 15,
2020, https://www.thewrap.com/fortune-heads-behind-digital-paywal; Stephen Altrogge, Pay for Play: Why Putting
Your Content Behind a Paywall is the Right Move for Your Website, PAPERFORM, Jan. 8, 2019,
https://paperform.co/blog/put-content-behind-paywall (Apparently, there are “hard” paywalls like the Wall Street
Journal, and “soft” paywalls that allow “metered” free content, or place premium content behind paywalls). But see,
Jol Ito, The Quest to Topple Science-Stymying Academic Paywalls, WIRED, Jan. 4, 2019,
https://www.wired.com/story/ideas-joi-ito-academic-paywalls/ (“[A]cademic publishers started to consolidate. They
solidified their grip on the rights to prestigious journals, allowing them to charge for access and exclude the majority
of the world from reading research publications—all while extracting billions in dollars of subscription fees from
university libraries and corporations.”); Dean Horowitz, You’ve Decided to Implement a Paywall. Now What?,
FOLIO, Jan. 24, 2019, https://www.foliomag.com/youve-decided-implement-paywall-now/ (“Instituting a paid
subscription model online is frankly unwise unless you’re focused on customer experience feedback. It is that

8

permission for his or her contributions, but given the nature of academic legal scholars and law review
editors, and their need to work quickly and efficiently with hundreds of sources cited it a single article
(even if only a fraction of these are to web materials), this may not be realistic, regardless of having
library registrars to train and issue policy for contribution to Perma.cc archives. Furthermore, scholarly
authors and journal editors historically are not accustomed to seeking permission for citations (and using
a Perma.cc link might trigger such an obligation).

II.

Fair Use and “Transformative Use”

While thorough copyright analysis includes analysis of the subject matter for originality or
copyrightability, 39 determination of copyright,40 and finding illicit copying,41 generally defenses for enduser use of Perma.cc would be found in fair use, and more recently, in one of its applications in the
doctrine of transformative use. This section shall consider the application of transformative use to
Perma.cc and its users. Section III that follows will consider fair use when transformative use does not
apply.
A.

Statutory Fair Use and Transformative Use

How do we get to transformative use as playing such an important role? The four factors of fair
use are well known as they have been set forth in 17 U.S.C. 107:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.42

simple.”); Lindsay McKenzie, Open Access at the Movies, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Sept. 10, 2018,
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/09/10/open-access-movement-hits-silver-screen (film takes on forprofit academic publishers and favors open-access movement).
39

See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (“Originality remains the sine
qua non of copyright”). See generally, ALFRED C. YEN & JOSEPH P. LIU, COPYRIGHT LAW: ESSENTIAL CASES AND
MATERIALS 14-58 (3rd ed, West Academic 2016) (coverage of copyrightability and originality).
40
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-152) (right of legal owner to bring suit for
infringement, subject to registration requirements of § 411).
41

See generally, YEN & LIU, supra note 39, at 229-74 (substantial similarity and improper appropriation

42

Id.

tests).

9

The factors are not meant to be exclusive.43 How much weight to give to each factor is not spelled out by
§ 107.44 However, certain practices have developed in the case law. For instance, the first factor takes
preeminence if there is transformative use (treated immediately below).45 Otherwise the fourth factor has
been recognized as preeminent.46
B.

History of Transformative Use

Prior to the doctrine of transformative use, which the Supreme Court debuted in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (1994),47 the majority of the Supreme Court (5-4 split) in Sony v. Universal City
Studios (1984), when applying the first factor analysis, found “noncommercial, nonprofit activity” by
users videotaping programs broadcast into their homes, described as “time-shifting”.48 The dissent found
this to be a mischaracterization of time-shifting.49 In truth, I have trouble imagining how videotaping is a
nonprofit activity (lacking even a reference to “education”) without at least a touch of commercial
activity, but the Supreme Court seemed to be looking for some way of finding a use under the first factor
that was not “commercial”—that was perhaps ground in between “commercial” and “nonprofit
educational” use. Having opened the door to such a middle ground, it is not surprising that
“transformative use” fell into it.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. was a music parody case that pointed out many of the uses
exemplified in the preamble of § 107 had commercial aspects.50 “If, indeed, commerciality carried
presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the

43
Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 529 (9th Cir. 2008) (“When conducting a fair use
analysis, we are not restricted to these factors; rather, the analysis is a flexible one that we perform on a case-by-case
basis.”) (citation omitted); at 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, § 13.05 [A][5][b], (“Consider that the factors
listed in the statute are preceded by the words ‘shall include,’ and that the statute as a whole defines use of the term
‘including’ as ‘illustrative and not limitative.’ For that reason, the four factors contained in Section 107 are merely
by way of example, rather than being an exhaustive enumeration.”); and WILLIAM F. PATRY, 4 PATRY ON
COPYRIGHT § 10:156 (Thomson Reuters, through March 2020 update) (“The listing of fair use purposes and factors
is thus “not intended to be exhaustive,” and accordingly courts are free to (but need not) consider factors beyond the
four enumerated in the statute”).
44

Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Accordingly, we find that the
District Court erred in giving each of the four factors equal weight, and in treating the four factors as a simple
mathematical formula. As we will explain, because of the circumstances of this case, some of the factors weigh
more heavily on the fair use determination than others.”).
45

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571 (1994) (“The more transformative the new
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use”).
46

From NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, “If one looks to the fair use cases, if not always to their stated rationale,
this [fourth factor] emerges the most important, and indeed, central fair use factor.” 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 21, at § 13.05[A][4] (citations omitted). See infra note 114.
47

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571.

48
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449, (1984) (Blackmun dissenting),
superseded by statute, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2877, as recognized in
Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
49

Sony, 464 U.S. at 496 (“As one commentator has observed, time-shifting is noncommercial in the same
sense that stealing jewelry and wearing it -- instead of reselling it -- is noncommercial.”).
50

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
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illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107 . . . .”51 Such judicial reasoning was ripe for
origination of transformative use. “The enquiry focuses on whether the new work merely supersedes the
objects of the original creation, or whether and to what extent it is ‘transformative,’ altering the original
with new expression, meaning, or message. The more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”52 What
followed over the years were a litany of cases, many in the 2nd Circuit, finding fair use based on
transformative use.53
C.

Limits of Transformative Use Doctrine in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco.

American Geophysical Union v. Texaco (2nd Cir. 1994) is an important case in defining the limits
of transformative use, particularly with reference to the issue of archiving and preservation. The Second
Circuit finds:
To the extent that the secondary use involves merely an untransformed duplication, the value
generated by the secondary use is little or nothing more than the value that inheres in the original.
Rather than making some contribution of new intellectual value and thereby fostering the
advancement of the arts and sciences, an untransformed copy is likely to be used simply for the
same intrinsic purpose as the original, thereby providing limited justification for a finding of fair
use.54

51

Id. at 584.

52

Id. at 571.

53

Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2003) (popularly known as the “Barbie in
blender case,” the court found defendant artist’s portrayal of the Mattel Barbie doll to be transformative, parodic, a
“sexualized perspective” and a comment on “Barbie’s influence on gender roles and the position of Women in
society”); Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 21-22 (1st Cir. 2000); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336
F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608-615 (2nd Cir.
2006) (court applies transformative use to all four factors in analysis); Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners,
800 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1001 (E.D. Wis. 2011), aff’d Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 693
(7th Cir. 2012); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 705-711 (2nd Cir., 2013) (court applies transformative use to all of
the factors); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97-100 (2nd Cir. 2014) (court applies transformative use
to first, second, and fourth factors, with respect to search function of database); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804
F.3d 202, 214-224 (2nd Cir. 2015) (court applies transformative use to all four factors, with respect to search snippet
view functions); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (applying but not finding
transformative use), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019).
54

Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994). American Geophysical Union
has been cited three times within the First Circuit: Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory,
689 F.3d 29, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2012) (for proposition that “[t]o the extent that the secondary [work] involves merely
an untransformed duplication, the value generated by the secondary [work] is little or nothing more than the value
that inheres in the original. . . . [T]hereby providing limited justification for a finding of fair use”); Nunez v.
Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2000) (for proposition that American Geophysical
“express[es] wariness of emphasis on commercial use because most secondary users seek commercial gain.”); and
Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217, 235 (D. Mass. 2009) (for the proposition, "[I]t is
sensible that a particular unauthorized use should be considered 'more fair' when there is no ready market or means
to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use should be considered 'less fair' when there is a ready market or
means to pay for the use.").

11

In American Geophysical Union the secondary use was to copy a journal article for local reference in the
offices of a Texaco employee.55 Research alone is not a secondary or transformative use.56 By analogy,
the web pages, articles, documents, spreadsheets, etc., on Perma.cc likewise undergo no transformation.
There is no new “intellectual value” through transformation. The intrinsic purpose is the same--to
provide the information on the web page, article, document, etc. Perma.cc just does so over a longer
period of time. Perhaps that is of “intellectual value,” but where is the transformation? The website,
article, document, etc. is hosted at a new location that is dedicated to long-term access, but how does that
fit into transformative analysis? Perhaps some court will find long-term preservation to be
transformative, but where is there a natural limiting principle to protect against abuse. Everything could
be copied for purpose of preservation.
D.

Limits of Transformative Use in HathiTrust and Google Books

Another case denoting the boundaries of transformative use analysis is Authors Guild, Inc. v.
HathiTrust (2nd Cir. 2014).57 Defendant HathiTrust listed among their arguments for fair use that by
“preserving the copyrighted books in digital form, the HDL [HathiTrust Digital Library] permits members
to create a replacement copy of the work, if the member already owned an original copy, the member's
original copy is lost, destroyed, or stolen, and a replacement copy is unobtainable at a ‘fair’ price
elsewhere.”58 The court, although finding fair use on other grounds for defendant HathiTrust,59 did not
find it appropriate to rule on this issue, because:
The record before the district court does not reflect whether the plaintiffs own copyrights in any
works that would be effectively irreplaceable at a fair price by the Libraries and, thus, would be
potentially subject to being copied by the Libraries in case of the loss or destruction of an
original. The Authors are not entitled to make this argument on behalf of others, because § 501 of
“the Copyright Act does not permit copyright holders to choose third parties to bring suits on
their behalf.”60
This is an interesting development in transformative use analysis. Before the court even begins to answer
the question of transformative use (or fair use) based on preservation of old and decaying materials, it has

55

See Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d, at 915.

56

The Second Circuit clarified this in Fox News Network v. TVEyes:

In Texaco, a company was allowing each of its 400 to 500 scientists to photocopy journal articles pertinent
to their individual research projects, thus enabling three subscriptions to service the needs of hundreds of
scientists . . . . We stated that if copying were deemed transformative ‘simply because [it was done] in the
course of doing research,’ then ‘the concept of a “transformative” use would be extended beyond
recognition.”
Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 178 n.4 (2d Cir. 2018) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
57

Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). HathiTrust has been cited once within the
First Circuit (the jurisdiction most likely to see litigation over Perma.cc), in Comerica Bank & Tr., N.A. v. Habib,
No. 17-12418-LTS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1343, at *21 (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2020) (but in a case that distinguishes
defendant’s actions as non-transformative).
58

HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 92.

59

See id. at 97-103 (the court found that full-text searching and access to the disabled were transformative
uses favoring the defendant).
60

Id. at 103-04.
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to know whether the plaintiffs are the specific copyright owners of such items. Lacking such proof, the
Second Circuit dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. There is no “live controversy for
adjudication.”61
But wouldn’t this issue always arise with any long-term data preservation? There are two
possible cases: (1) the materials are linked to and archived in Perma.cc and are still available on the Web
(either at their original location or elsewhere) or (2) the materials are linked to and archived in Permal.cc
but are not still available on the Web (either at their original location or elsewhere). More of these cases
will be discussed below, but in case (1) defendants are placed in the awkward position of arguing that
because the materials might disappear one day, archiving them is a fair use. It is an instance of
unauthorized copying as a form of “access insurance”—something the law of fair use has not recognized.
Maybe the law should find access insurance to be fair use, even transformative use, but no court or statute
has done so yet.62 Nimmer has pointed out that the very absence of a work may build up its demand for
additional publication.63 Sometimes removing a work from circulation is strategic.
In case (2) the plaintiffs need to establish that they owned the materials previously linked to the
Web, and the defendants need to establish the materials are “effectively irreplaceable at a fair price,”64
presumably by not being available elsewhere than the original link. In case (2), there are lots of
possibilities for availability elsewhere—located at other locations on the Web, placement behind a cyber
“pay wall,” distributed in print for purchase, or accessible by contacting the original authors or creators of
the materials. Thus, while a suit by Authors Guild or similar collective rights organization might be
blocked in the Second Circuit under HathiTrust for lacking a live controversy, there may plausibly be
plenty of plaintiffs satisfying case (1) or (2) for a case against Perma.cc and its contributors. HathiTrust
does not provide much shelter from litigation for Perma.cc.
In 2015, Authors Guild v. Google also does not provide much cover from litigation for Perma.cc
and its users.65 The Second Circuit examined the “search and snippet view” functions of Google Books.
As with HathiTrust (and iParadigms), the purpose of Google's copying of the original copyrighted
books is to make available significant information about those books, permitting a searcher to
identify those that contain a word or term of interest, as well as those that do not include
reference to it. In addition, through the ngrams tool, Google allows readers to learn the frequency
of usage of selected words in the aggregate corpus of published books in different historical
periods. We have no doubt that the purpose of this copying is the sort of transformative purpose
described in Campbell as strongly favoring satisfaction of the first factor.66

61

Id. at 104.

62

The only instance of preservation being treated as fair use that this author can find is in a Senate Report
to the 1976 Copyright Act, commenting that preservation of decaying nitrate firm is fair use. See infra notes 94
through 96 and accompanying text for a more thorough treatment.
63

“In short, the fact that a work is out of print cannot mean that its copyright becomes vitiated. Works out
of print are published in new editions when the demand becomes sufficient. Such demand may never arise if
competitors may freely copy the out-of-print work.” 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, § 13.05[A][2][b][i].
64

HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 103.

65

Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 2015).

66

Id. at 217.
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Besides the search function, the court also found snippet view “adds importantly to the highly
transformative purpose of identifying books of interest to the searcher.”67 Perma.cc does not provide
searchable databases or “snippet” views to facilitate identification of relevant materials. It is an archive
of web material that may extend the availability of some of the materials.68 It is a preservation tool only.
E.

Limits of Second Circuit and Transformative Use

The preeminence of the Second Circuit in “transformative use” cases should give us pause.69 In
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit eventually criticized the Second
Circuit for a line of cases, ending in Cariou v. Prince,70 that supported the transformative use doctrine:
We're skeptical of Cariou's approach, because asking exclusively whether something is
“transformative” not only replaces the list in § 107 but also could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2),
which protects derivative works. To say that a new use transforms the work is precisely to say
that it is derivative and thus, one might suppose, protected under § 106(2). Cariou and its
predecessors in the Second Circuit do not explain how every “transformative use” can be “fair
use” without extinguishing the author’s rights under § 106(2). 71
In 2016, after the HathiTrust and Google books cases, even the Second Circuit, sensitive to criticism from
the Seventh Circuit and Nimmer on Copyright, would acknowledge that Cariou was “the high-water mark
of our court’s recognition of transformative works . . . .”72 Furthermore, in 2018, in Fox News Network
v. TVEyes, the Second Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court to find TVEyes’ archiving of

67

Id. at 218.

68
Perma.cc does permit the addition of metadata and for members of the same organization to view each
other’s submissions. For instance, all of the members of a law review might have access to all of the Perma.cc links
in articles being published by the review. See Perma.cc user guide Perma Records & Links, PERMA.CC,
https://perma.cc/docs/perma-link-creation#organizing-links (last visited May 19, 2019).
69

See supra note 53.

70

Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). Cariou was criticized
by Nimmer because Prince (the defendant artist) was not “trying to create anything with a new meaning or a new
message . . . .” 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, at § 13.05[B][6]. In addition, the plaintiff suffered
significant damages when his art show was canceled, usurped by Cariou’s.
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the application of this factor does not focus principally on the
question of damage to Cariou's derivative market. We have made clear that “our concern is not whether the
secondary use suppresses or even destroys the market for the original work or its potential derivatives, but
whether the secondary use usurps the market of the original work.”
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708 (citing Blanch v. Koons, 467 F. 3d 244, 258 (2nd Cir. 2006)). Cariou was cited only once
within the First Circuit (the place most likely to see litigation regarding Perma.cc), Comerica Bank & Tr., N.A. v.
Habib, No. 17-12418-LTS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1343, at *24 (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2020) (for the limited proposition
that creative works favor the plaintiff).
71

Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied S. Ct. 1555 (2015).

72

TCA TV Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 181 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2175 (2017).
For criticism of “transformative use,” see 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, at § 13.05 [A][1][b]. “[T]he
transformative use standard has become all things to all people.” Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach
to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1670 (2004).
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videos not to be fair use.73 Specifically, the Second Circuit pointed out that Authors Guild v. Google, a
transformative use case, had “tested[ed] the boundaries of fair use.”74 I point this out because it is now
less likely that the Second Circuit, whose opinions have been so important to the development of the
transformative use doctrine, would extend the doctrine further to cover archiving for preservation, as in
the instance of Perma.cc.
The point is made about the Second Circuit’s extended reach over its history with “transformative
use” is to inform the reader that reliance upon the Second Circuit as the source for all things
“transformative” may be imprudent, although certainly the doctrine is treated in other Circuits.75
F.

Limits of Transformative Use in Cambridge University Press v. Patton

For universities and libraries, an important limitation on transformative use might be found in the
Eleventh Circuit case of Cambridge University Press v. Patton.76 The case comes close to considering
archival preservation, but falls short, and is really about providing free, archival access for students to
educational materials. The case centered on the issue of university library course reserves consisting of
73

See Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 2018), rev’g Fox News
Network v. TVEyes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). District Court had held that “archiving function is
fair use” for video and radio clips from broadcasts. Id at 334. The video archiving originally protected by the
Southern District of New York was not strictly for preservation, but to compliment “searching and indexing
functions. Id. Indeed, it was TVEyes users who selected clips for later use, and which consequently were stored on
TVEye’s servers for more than the default 32 days, set for unselected clips. Id. at 333. Likewise, it is Perma.cc end
users who determine what is archived, although there is no searching and indexing function, unless we count the
metadata, annotating services offered by Perma.cc. See Perma.cc user guide/Perma Records & Links, PERMA.CC,
https://perma.cc/docs/perma-link-creation#annotating-links (last visited May 21, 2020).
74

TVEyes, 883 F.3d at 174 (citing Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 2015)).

75

At the time of this writing, a search of “’fair use’ AND transformative” in “Copyright Law Cases” on
Lexis+ produces 453 federal cases, with the most such cases in the Ninth Circuit (155), compared to 136 in the
Second Circuit. Of course, not all of these cases may have found “transformative use.” The Circuit Court figures
include cases in their respective District Courts. Major cases in the Ninth Circuit include Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th
Cir. 2002), Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d
1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012); and Seltzer v. Green Day,
Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). Important Second Circuit cases have already been set forth in supra note 53.
The First Circuit, where Perma.cc and Harvard find their home, includes only 18 cases (of which only two are
appellate cases). The most important case from that circuit is perhaps Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235
F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000), which dealt with whether photographs of a naked beauty pageant winner appearing without
authorization in a local television news program were fair use—they were. But Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration
Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2012) is also important for assertion that “[t]o the extent
that the secondary [work] involves merely an untransformed duplication, the value generated by the secondary
[work] is little or nothing more than the value that inheres in the original. . . . [T]hereby providing limited
justification for a finding of fair use.”
Similarly, when cases are selected in Westlaw Edge based on Topic No. 99 and Key Number 53.2 “Fair use
and other permitted uses in general” and then limited to those cases that use “transformative” in the text, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has 36 cases and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 25. In this instance, cases from
the district court for each circuit are not included. The Second and Ninth Circuits lead in the number of
transformative use cases. In Westlaw Edge findings in the First Circuit include the same cases found in Lexis+.
76

Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014), remanded to Cambridge Univ. Press
v. Becker, 371 F. Supp. 3d 1218 (N.D. Ga. 2016), aff’d in part and vacated in part, Cambridge Univ. Press v.
Albert, 906 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2018), remanded to Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 1:08-CV-1425-ODE,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35134 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2020).
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the digitization of book chapters (sometimes multiple chapters in the same book). The Eleventh Circuit
applied the test from Acuff, "whether the new work merely supersede[s] the objects of the original
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message . . . ."77 The court ultimately found that the defendant
university library’s digitization of course reserve did not qualify as a transformative use.
Here, Defendants' use of excerpts of Plaintiffs' works is not transformative. The excerpts of
Plaintiffs' works posted on GSU's [Georgia State University’s] electronic reserve system are
verbatim copies of portions of the original books which have merely been converted into a digital
format. Although a professor may arrange these excerpts into a particular order or combination
for use in a college course, this does not imbue the excerpts themselves with any more than a de
minimis amount of new meaning. See Princeton University Press … ("[I]f you make verbatim
copies of 95 pages of a 316-page book, you have not transformed the 95 pages very much—even
if you juxtapose them to excerpts from other works.").78
The reasoning of the case is apropos to our analysis of Perma.cc’s service and transformative use. Like
Perma.cc, the defendant was a nonprofit, or technically the key officers of a nonprofit university (Georgia
State University) were defendants. The use was educational, but the placing of print book chapters into a
digital course reserve system, that could deliver items by links, failed transformative use. Perma.cc
makes verbatim copies of the web materials is collects. Under the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit,
Perma.cc’s archival preservation of digital materials already on the Web, would not be found to be
transformative because such action “does not imbue the excerpts [or web material] themselves with any
more than a de minimis amount of new meaning.”79 The only distinction is that it is Perma.cc end users
that are requesting that the Perma.cc copy web materials, and because of that we must look to theories of
vicarious liability, contributory infringement, and 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).80 However, if Cambridge turns out
to be our guide, a standard fair use analysis, without consideration of transformative use, is the proper
mode analysis, even for the activities of Perma.cc’s end users.
G.

Transformative Use and the Problem of Preservation

Some may argue that preservation of materials online is, in and of itself, a transformative use,
underscored by the phenomenon of linkrot. However, our inquiry into transformative use has never come
across an instance in caselaw of preservation being a transformative or fair use.81 Furthermore, if it were,
just about any copying could be justified as transformative on the off chance that the original material
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Cambridge, 769 F.3d at 1262 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, (1994)).

78

Cambridge, 769 F.3d at 1262 (quoting Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381,
1389 (6th Cir. 1996)).
79

Cambridge, 769 F.3d at 1262.

80

See infra section V.

81

The Second Circuit in Texaco refrained from ruling against all archival copying.

We do not mean to suggest that no instance of archival copying would be fair use, but the first factor tilts
against Texaco in this case because the making of copies to be placed on the shelf in Chickering's office is
part of a systematic process of encouraging employee researchers to copy articles so as to multiply
available copies while avoiding payment.
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 920 (2d Cir. 1994). The key to Texaco is the avoidance of
payment. That is not really that different from Perma.cc’s archival copying, regardless of whether it is for non-profit
institutions.
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might become unavailable. There is no natural limiting principle to the uses to which transformative use
could be applied if every preservation were to qualify as transformative.82 Where do we draw the line
without predicting which web materials are likely to become inaccessible? Is it enough that a significant
percentage of web materials, accessible today, will suffer linkrot tomorrow? There has to be some way to
limit the application of preservation as a transformative use, and if not, then preservation alone should not
serve as a limiting principle.83
Some may point to the long existence of the Internet Archive’s WayBack Machine,84 which
seems to have escaped liability over copyright, as indication that preservation is transformative use.
There is no caselaw directly on point,85 but the WayBack Machine does something Perma.cc does not—it

82

An example of application of the limiting principle and fair use is found in Princeton Univ. Press v.
Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386 n.2 (6th Cir. 1996):
And if the fairness of making copies depends on what the ultimate consumer does with the copies, it is hard
to see how the manufacture of pirated editions of any copyrighted work of scholarship could ever be an
unfair use. . . . [T]he dissenters' suggestion -- which proposes no limiting principle -- runs counter to the
legislative history of the Copyright Act and has properly been rejected by the courts.
Id.
83
We could argue that the limiting principle is citation in a scholarly article or court document, but even so,
not all the materials underlying the web citation will disappear due to linkrot. The same problem of a limiting
principle is just as relevant with the preservation of web material that is in fact cited in scholarship.
84

INTERNET ARCHIVE, WAYBACK MACHINE, https://archive.org/web/ (last visited May 21, 2020) (emphasis

added).
85

The sole published decision involving the Internet Archive is Internet Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d
755 (D. Co. 2007). Oddly, Internet Archive filed a declaratory relief action to substantiate that federal copyright law
preempts the contractual provisions of Shell’s website, which the Internet Archive had copied. There is nothing in
the decision to provide guidance on actual copyright issues of Internet Archive’s copying Shell’s website.
Researching further, the Internet Archive’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims suggest that a copyright
infringement claim was once been part of the pleadings.
After threatening plaintiff and counterclaim-defendant Internet Archive, a non-profit digital library, with a
baseless lawsuit challenging the Archive's mission of creating a historical record of the Internet that is
accessible to the public (a practice that has recently been held lawful with respect to other archivists by at
least two courts), defendant and counterclaimant Suzanne Shell (“Shell”) has now attempted to turn up the
heat on this non-profit organization with a series of far-fetched and legally inapposite counterclaims. With
the exception of her copyright infringement claim (which is substantively without merit but probably
properly alleged), Shell's counterclaims fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Internet Archive’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims at 1, Internet Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d. 755 (D. Co.
2007) (No. 06-cv-01726-LTB-CBS), 2006 WL 3851749, at 1 (emphasis added). I have been unable to locate the
cases that have upheld archiving the Internet, as mentioned in the Motion.
However, the original suit was filed in the Northern District of California. The Internet Archive’s original
Complaint for Declaratory Relief of Copyright Non-Infringement did determine the action originally arose under
copyright law. Complaint for Declaratory Relief of Copyright Non-Infringement at 3, ¶12, Internet Archive v. Shell
(2006) (No. 3:06-cv-00397) (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20 2006) (available on Bloomberg Docket Search). The Plaintiff, Shell,
was unsatisfied with simple removal of her website from the Internet Archive and demanded $100,000 in damages
for infringement. Id. at 3-4, ¶ 13-15. Internet Archive’s claim was that “Internet Archive has not violated Shell’s
copyrights. Internet Archive made fair and permissible use of the www.profane-justice.org website for the purposes
of offering permanent access for researchers, historians, scholars, and the public to historical collections that exist in
digital format.” Id. at 4, ¶ 20. According to Bloomberg Law Docket Search, this case was eventually transferred to
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documents the transition of websites over time. The Internet Archive also honors “tagging files for robot
exclusion,”86 unlike Perma.cc, which archives material with “noarchive” metatags, but with limited access
to end users and their organizations.87 Like Perma.cc, the Internet Archive also adheres to takedown
requests by authors and publishers.88 If anything, the Internet Archive has appeased those authors and
publishers who do not want their materials included in the Archive, perhaps thus escaping liability by
taking sites down. Unlike Perma.cc, the Internet Archive allows for web addresses to be searched. In the
end, the Internet Archive, with the right case, may be subject to the liability. This article finds no cover
for archives under the Copyright Code.
In fact, four book publishers recently filed suit against the Internet Archive for providing access
to over a 1.3 million books that were still within copyright during COVID-19 as part of its Open Library’s
“National Emergency Library.”89 While the digitization and lending (unrestricted during early weeks of
COVID-19) of books is factually different than Perma.cc’s archiving of web materials, similarities arise
because Perma.cc archives whole documents and creates unrestricted access through a footnote link.
What is lacking, thankfully, in Perma.cc’s instance is a group of powerful plaintiffs who are motivated to
launch litigation, especially, when authors of works can always request that materials be taken down
(although the Internet Archive’s National Emergency Library also responded to takedown requests).90 So
far, Perma.cc is “flying under the radar” without potential plaintiffs that care enough to sue.

III.

Fair Use Analysis without Transformative Use

Being unable to pin preservation neatly under the doctrine of transformative use,91 our analysis
needs to return to standard fair use analysis with a heavy emphasis on educational nonprofit use and the
the District of Colorado, effective Sept. 5, 2006 (per Receipt of transferred case from USDC-Colorado), and
resulted in the published opinion discussed above. I have been unable to retrieve any further documentation from
Bloomberg (or a document delivery service) since the docket includes material in 2006, prior to comprehensive
Pacer coverage.
86

See Internet Archive's Terms of Use, Privacy Policy, and Copyright Policy, INTERNET ARCHIVE,
WAYBACK MACHINE, https://archive.org/about/terms.php (last visited May 21, 2020).
While we collect publicly available Internet documents, sometimes authors and publishers express a desire
for their documents not to be included in the Collections (by tagging a file for robot exclusion or by
contacting us or the original crawler group). If the author or publisher of some part of the Archive does not
want his or her work in our Collections, then we may remove that portion of the Collections without notice.
Id.
87
See Perma.cc user guide: Perma Records & Links, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/docs/perma-linkcreation#private-records (last visited May 19, 2020).
88

See supra note 86.
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Complaint at 1-2, Hachette Book Group, Inc., HarperCollins, LLC, Wiley & Sons, Inc., and Penguin
Random House LLC v. Internet Archive, No. 1:20-cv-04160 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2020). See also, Campbell Kwan, Is
Internet Archive's unrestricted lending of 1.4 million books legal?, Tech Republic (June 15, 2020, 12:52 PM),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/is-internet-archives-unrestricted-lending-of-1-4-million-books-legal/.
90

See Defendant Internet Archive’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Complaint at 2-3, Hachette
Book Group, Inc. v. Internet Archive, No. 1:20-cv-04160-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 28, 2020).
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Transformative use is not necessary for finding of fair use, but it does heavily influence the analysis.
“Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, …, the goal of copyright, to
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.” Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citations omitted).
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effect on the market. Before beginning with the four factors, let us consider the preamble and the
legislative history of the fair use code section.
A.

Preamble and Legislative History of 17 U.S.C. § 107

The preamble for § 107 lists “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research”92 as examples of what might be fair use, but there are
many instances when each of these activities has been found not to constitute fair use.93 On the other
hand, activities considered to be fair use come from the legislative history rather than text of the statute:
Quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment; quotation
of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for illustration or clarification of the author’s
observations; use in a parody of some of the content of the work parodied; summary of an
address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a portion of
a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a teacher or student of a small part of a
work to illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports;
incidental and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located in the scene
of an event being reported.”94
This is the legislative source of parody as a fair use because parody is not listed in the text of § 107.
Important to this audience, there is an instance when the same House Report for the 1976
Copyright Act encouraged the preservation of prints for motion pictures made before 1942, which is the
date of conversion of “film stock” with a nitrate base.95 This is an instance when archival preservation
was deemed a fair use by a House of Representatives Report. It is the only instance I could find in which
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17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-152).

93

E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (“If, indeed, commerciality carried
presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses
listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107 . . . .”); Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)
(news scooping not fair use where “supplant[ed] copyright holder’s commercially valuable right of first
publication”); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996) (“It is true that
the use to which the materials are put by the students who purchase the coursepacks is noncommercial in nature. But
the use of the materials by the students is not the use that the publishers are challenging.”); Am. Geophysical Union
v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 919-21 (2d Cir. 1994) (copying for research and archival use not fair use); Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (criticism or satire of society based on prior copyright work is not fair use);
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1531 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The use of the Kinko's
packets, in the hands of the students, was no doubt educational. However, the use in the hands of Kinko's employees
is commercial.”); Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1169-70 (W.D.N.Y. 1982)
(cumulative copying of educational broadcasting by school district not fair use).
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H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 76 (1976) (emphasis added).

95

Id. at 73 (1976).

A problem of particular urgency is that of preserving for posterity prints of motion pictures made before
1942. Aside from the deplorable fact that in a great many cases the only existing copy of a film has been
deliberately destroyed, those that remain are in immediate danger of disintegration; they were printed on
film stock with a nitrate base that will inevitably decompose in time. The efforts of the Library of
Congress, the American Film Institute, and other organizations to rescue and preserve this irreplaceable
contribution to our cultural life are to be applauded, and the making of duplicate copies for purposes of
archival preservation certainly falls within the scope of "fair use."
Id.
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preservation is demarcated as fair use,96 but it comes, not from the courts, but from a House Report. The
certainty of the loss of all films with a nitrate base and the collaboration of the Library of Congress and
the American Film Institute to save these films probably influenced the Report’s finding of fair use. For
those who would argue that preservation is generally a fair use, there is scant legislative evidence of it.
Without further legislation (and hopefully some cooperation of stakeholders of the Internet, libraries,
archives, and educational institutions), evidence supporting preservation as a fair use is unlikely.
B.

Education Nonprofit, Noncommercial Use

Returning to the four factors, the first factor of fair use analysis requires us to consider whether
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes . . . .97
The creator of Perma.cc is Harvard’s Library Innovation Lab.98 No advertising appears on the site.
Academic institutions may qualify for free, unlimited service. Academic libraries may signup to be
Perma.cc “registrars,” thereby providing unlimited service to their users.99 However, individual users
may also signup, but if not affiliated with a library that is a Perma.cc registrar, they must pay a
subscription price after ten uses.100 Non-academic institutions also pay subscription fees. 101 Information
about the price of the subscription is not available on the website prior to actual subscription. Perma.cc’s
strategy seems to be to drive users to pressure their home libraries to become Perma.cc registrars and
partners, and then their end users get unlimited, free access.
What Perma.cc has created is a network of mostly educational and nonprofit registrars that are in
many instances academic law libraries. The nature of the organization of the network suggests
educational, nonprofit use; however, it is not only the nature of the user or network enabling the use, but
the nature of the use that is critical.102 Some of the preservation may be of commercial websites or
materials, such as from news sites or blogs.103 The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he crux of the
profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user
stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price.”104 In
this instance, we must consider whether any of four possible “users” of Perma.cc-linked, copyrighted
works on the Web—namely, Perma.cc, registrars, scholarly end users, and readers of the scholarly output
with Perma.cc links—“profit from exploitation.”
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Perhaps this is so because most preservation protections for libraries and archives are found under § 108.
See infra Section F.
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17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-152).
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See About Perma.cc, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/about (last visited May 22, 2020).
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See Perma.cc for Libraries, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/libraries (last visited May 22, 2020).
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See Sign up with Perma.cc, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/sign-up (last visited. May 22, 2020).
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See Perma.cc user guide/Accounts, Perma.cc, https://perma.cc/docs/accounts#paid-service (last visited
May 22, 2020).
102
See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1264 (11th Cir. 2014) (“GSU is a nonprofit
educational institution. While this is relevant, our inquiry does not end there: we must consider not only the nature
of the user, but the use itself.”) (citing Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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See supra note 29.
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Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). Also cited in Cambridge, 769 F.3d at 1265.
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The question is do they exploit from archived material without paying the “customary price?” If
use of Perma.cc allows the circumvention of paywalls or obviates the need to purchase publications once
freely accessible on the Web, it is hard to see how at least one of the four copyright users, and perhaps all,
are not profiting without “paying the customary price”:
1. Perma.cc is copying and archiving web material.
2. Registrars are profiting by providing valuable services (in the case of law libraries) to law
journals and faculty researchers, whose own end product is enriched with access to
archived Perma.cc-linked works.
3. Scholarly authors, in the case of law professors with a law library registrar, are directing
Perma.cc to copy and archive web material without payment, thus increasing the value of
their own works over time by avoiding dead links and by distributing the Perma-cc linked
works.105
4. Ultimately, the “downstream” readers of scholarly work may gain access to, and perhaps
even download (thereby copying), the materials cited in the scholarly works, which in
some cases, are no longer otherwise accessible by original web links.
Even in the instance of genuine scholarship, exploitation can occur. Perma.cc links make it possible for
the downstream readers to access works (if no longer available online) that in a print environment would
likely have at least required a trip to the library (which indeed had paid for copies of the material). Even
with respect to web materials, which are no longer available online, downstream readers would have had
to seek out for-profit databases, subscribed to by them or their host institutions, perhaps even paying for
just the one Perm.cc-linked work. The paywall has been circumvented without its due payment.
Everyone, from the downstream reader, up the stream or process benefits from the free access provided
by Perma.cc. I write this, not because I am in favor of our intellectual material being secured by paywalls
(I am not), but because we must consider the “customary price” in current fair use and copyright analysis.
True, in some instances copyright owners may have granted permission for copying their web
material,106 and true some material may be in the public domain, such as federal government reports (the
example on Perma.cc’s website is of the FBI’s Top Ten List),107 but the utility of Perma.cc links will
likely drive much content into the archive that is outside authorized use and the public domain, just as is
the case with the Internet Archive’s WayBack Machine.108 Indeed, I was able to do it easily enough in
my test trial of Perma.cc.109
From a policy perspective, it is not a simple case of Perma.cc depriving authors of web materials’
rewards for the “sweat of their brow.” Instead, Perma.cc offers a public good,110 that might otherwise be
105

Distribution is an exclusive right of authors, just as reproduction is. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (1), (3)
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-152).
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This was the case in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 443-44 (1984)
(less than 10% of copying television broadcasts was authorized) (Blackmun dissenting), superseded by statute
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2877, as recognized in Realnetworks, Inc. v.
DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (superseded by the anti-circumvention and
anti-trafficking sections of the DMCA, which are different than the code section we are dealing with here).
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See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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See INTERNET ARCHIVE, WAYBACK MACHINE, https://archive.org/web/ (last visited May 21, 2020).
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See supra note 29.
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See YEN & LIU, supra note 39, at 6-11. See also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 352 -54 (1991) (rejecting “sweat of the brow” doctrine).
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unavailable--a solution to link-rot. Copyright law should not perfunctorily disallow a solution for
scholarly communities to benefit from services like Perma.cc, whether or not they pay the “customary
price.” More subtle analysis is needed. At this point, to best serve our analysis, we need to skip to the
all-important fourth factor, the effect upon the potential market.111
C.

Effect upon the Potential Market

The fair use factor reads, “(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”112 The Supreme Court has stated: “The fourth factor is the ‘most important, and
indeed, central fair use factor.’”113 As Nimmer has stated, “If one looks to the fair use cases, if not always
to their stated rationale, this [fourth factor] emerges the most important, and indeed, central fair use
factor.” 114
Works that were once freely available on the Web may move behind paywalls, move to a
subscription news archive or service,115 or be published as books or eBooks, and Perma.cc may have cited
to and preserved early drafts of such works that were once freely available on the Web, but which have
been removed. Perhaps such movement or change in status from freely accessible does not seem realistic,
but I remind the reader of my experience with ABA Cloud-Based Ethics Opinions,116 which were once
freely accessible and are now behind a paywall. In such situations, there may be real economic loss from
readers of scholarly articles who choose to access Perma.cc links rather than pay up at pay walls (this is
“market substitution”),117 but there is more to the analysis than the prospective plaintiff’s losses. There
are potential markets here for archived news and blogs. There is even a potential market for archiving
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17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-152).
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Id.
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Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (quoting 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, at §
13.05[A]). See also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).
114

4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, at § 13.05[A][4] (citations omitted). See Robinson v. Random
House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830, 842 & n.4, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“most important of the four,” “vital fourth factor”);
Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (This [fourth] factor is arguably the
most important of the four enumerated factors of the fair use analysis), aff’d on other grounds, 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir.
1998); Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1275 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Because Defendants' use is
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threat of market substitution here is great and thus the fourth factor looms large in the overall fair use analysis.”).
Nimmer comments on an empirical study affirming the importance of the fourth factor. See 4 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, at § 13.05[A][4], fn. 217.4 (commenting on Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S.
Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584 (2008)).
115

The movement of “teaser” news stories on Web from free viewing to subscription only is discussed in
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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See Cambridge Univ. Press, 769 F.3d at 1275. Market substitution affects the first, third and fourth

factors.
The reference to market substitution ensnares the third factor in the fourth. The reference in third factor
analysis to purpose and character likewise implicates the first fair use factor. Copying a work verbatim not
only weighs against fair use under the third factor; it also “may reveal a dearth of transformative character”
inclining the first factor against fair use, plus show more likely market harm by superseding the original,
thus disfavoring fair use under the fourth factor.
4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, at § 13.05[C][2].
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garden-variety websites—Weather.com on a given day. We must look at the overall market (including
net positive effects, perhaps offered by Perma.cc).118
Again, Nimmer is important to our analysis. He points out the danger of circularity in evaluating
potential markets:
A danger of circularity is posed here—a potential market, no matter how unlikely, has always
been supplanted in every fair use case, to the extent that the defendant, by definition, has made
some actual use of plaintiff’s work, which use could in turn be defined in terms of the relevant
potential market. In other words, it is a given in every fair use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of a
potential market if that potential is defined as the theoretical market for licensing the very use at
bar. For example, if the plaintiff complains that snippets of her rock-and-roll song lyrics have
been appropriated by defendant for a quiz in its book of 1960’s trivia, one could define the
supplanted potential market as the possibility of licensing rock song lyrics for quiz books.119
We might suppose there is potential market for archived, cited sources. Owners of copyrighted works are
not entitled to dominion over every “theoretical” market. Perma.cc creates a single market source for a
solution. Without it, the market of solutions is fractured, incomplete and with diverse solutions for some,
but not all, web citations in an article. Arguably, owners of web content do not have an interest in or
capacity of occupying the niche of a comprehensive solution that Perma.cc offers, but do they have the
right through copyright law to see that the market for archived web materials stays fractured, and multisourced—a world without Perma.cc? Nimmer’s commentary above suggests that there are limits to
copyright dominion in potential markets. Copyright owners might be interested in preservation archiving
of works they own, but they probably lack the will to work with others, even competitors, for a single
solution like Perma.cc. Without Perma.cc, there is a market failure to provide a comprehensive answer to
linkrot in the context of scholarly citations.
Professor Wendy Gordon claims market failure is a rationale for limiting the rights of copyright
owners.120 Gordon proposes: “Fair use should be awarded to the defendant in a copyright infringement
action when (1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is socially desirable; and (3)
an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright
owner.”121 As further elaboration of the principle of market failure, “Market failure should be found only
when the defendant can prove that the copyright owner would refuse to license out of a desire unrelated to
the goals of copyright -- notably, a desire to keep certain information from the public.”122 Parody and
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See 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 43, at § 10:55. “For example, a search engine’s retrieval and
display of excerpts from a copyrighted book will likely lead to increased sales, as well as providing valuable
information to the individual who initiated the query. Under these facts, the fourth factor should weigh in
defendant's favor.” Id. But such use of search engines is transformative, and such is not the case here with
Perma.cc. See also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311-12 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Under this factor a balance must be
struck between the benefit gained by the copyright owner when the copying is found an unfair use and the benefit
gained by the public when the use is held to be fair. The less adverse impact on the owner, the less public benefit
need be shown to sustain non-commercial fair use.”).
119

4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, § 13.05[A][4] (citations omitted).

120

Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural And Economic Analysis of The Betamax
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982).
121

Id.

122
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criticism are exhibit A of an owner having an interest to keep certain information from the public.123 But
Perma.cc does not easily fit within these examples, nor is it necessarily true that copyright owners would
refuse to license access to materials otherwise archived by Perma.cc. What copyright owners might not
be willing to do is license their works with their competitors in a comprehensive, long-term archival
solution to linkrot like Perma.cc. Even if, we apply the market failure theory to a licensing of a
comprehensive solution, there may be “substantial injury” to some copyright owners if they had moved
their works behind a paywall or submitted for formal publication. Furthermore, market failure as a theory
does not have wide-scale adoption.
To illustrate the limited application of market failure as a theory, consider Clean Flicks of Colo.,
LLC v. Soderbergh.124 Clean Flicks purchased legal copies of DVD movies or obtained them from
customers, it then replaced the DVD with a DVD redacted for sexuality, violence, and offensive language
according to a menu of specifications selected by the customer. There were other defendants, using
different redaction techniques. Plaintiffs from the motion picture industry sued for infringement. Among
other things, defendants “argued lack of market harm”:
The counterclaim defendants contend that there is no adverse effect from their use of the movies
on the value of the copyrighted work to the Studios. They suggest that the Studios benefit because
they are selling more copies of their movies as a result of the editing parties’ practice of
maintaining a one-to-one ratio of the original and edited versions. It is assumed that the
consumers of the edited versions would not have themselves purchased the authorized versions
because of the objectionable content and the Studios do not compete in this alternative market.125
The District Court was unsympathetic, instead championing “the intrinsic value of the right to control the
content of the copyrighted work which is the essence of the law of copyright.”126 Nimmer is critical:
By framing the matter in terms of “a question of what audience the copyright owner wants to
reach,” the decision ignores the logic of prior cases that construe this fourth factor as favoring fair
use to the extent defendant’s work fills a market niche that plaintiff has no interest in
occupying.127
Clean Flicks and co-defendants filled a “market niche,” but the copyright owners’ preference to serve
only certain markets took precedence.
Under the theory of “market failure” propounded by Professor Gordon,128 Clean Flicks and codefendants occupied a niche that move studios were not filling. Market failure was present, transfer to the
defendants was “socially desirable,” and the movie studios actually benefited from increased sales of their
films. Furthermore, the refusal to give permission was motivated by other than traditional objectives of
copyright to incentivize new works, but the refusals controlled the uses and presentation of film works.
All the elements of Gordon’s theory were satisfied, but the Colorado District Court ruled otherwise,
123
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giving studio’s unfettered control over the work. Thus, we cannot entirely rely on theories of market
failure to support Perma.cc archiving.
Even assuming the theory of “market failure” were widely adopted by courts in the future, it
might not squarely apply to the facts Perma.cc presents. First, the vast array of copyright owners whose
works are on the Web and who are cited and archived by Perma.cc’s end-user scholars may be unable to
fill a niche of a comprehensive solution to scholarly linkrot, but some of them (at least a few) will want to
provide their own archival solutions into the future.129 The issue is how the market is defined—a
comprehensive archival solution for scholarly linkrot or a fragmented archival solution in favor of a few
copyright owners. Secondly, if that hurdle is passed, it is probably true that having a comprehensive
scholarly linkrot solution like Perma.cc is socially desirable, but thirdly, there will be adverse financial
incentives for copyright owners of the Web material to include the content in free archives.
Just to illustrate, a scholar places a draft of a book or article on the Web prior to publication, but
then she withdraws it once a publisher has accepted the manuscript—only to find that her book or article
is still available through Perma.cc.130 The incentive to place drafts on the Web (perhaps for comment and
criticism) is diminished if archives like Perma.cc decreases sales of the final book or journal for the
article. Copyright owners, perhaps scholars in their own right, may want to remove papers or materials
that they no longer stand behind. If Perma.cc keeps them in perpetuity, copyright owners’ incentive to
make their draft or early versions of works available on the Web is diminished. News sites may become
reluctant to put up “teaser” news stories,131 outside of their subscription services, if their owners know
they may be preserved in perpetuity in free archives like Perma.cc. Perhaps the damage is small and the
risks slight in the relatively esoteric domain of legal scholarship, but Perma.cc could be used or
implemented for all kinds of scholarship, publishing, and even used in news reporting itself (well beyond
the original use for legal scholarship and court documents). The damages would then be quite far
reaching if the scale of adoption grows into new segments of scholarship, publishing and news.132 In any
event, the final element of Gordon’s market failure theory is problematic for Perma.cc.
On the other hand, scholarship taking advantage of Perma.cc has enhanced value because its
citations are stable and free of linkrot. Furthermore, there is greater incentive to use sources on the
Internet in scholarship because Perma.cc is giving scholarly materials on the Web a permanency that the
Web lacked before. The incentives would be there for websites and materials to be placed on the Web
because they might be picked up as part of the scholarly discourse. It is both the benefits to society and
detriments to copyright holders that must be considered when weighing the fourth factor.133 This goes
directly to the balance the Copyright Section of the Constitution strikes: “To promote the progress of
129
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science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.”134
How the courts evaluate the market benefits to society and benefits and detriments to Web
content creators may be decisive in resolving the matter. One of the advantages to copyright owners is
that they may be able to point to real or more concrete damages in instances where earlier, no-longerauthorized, drafts of their work circulate on the Web through Perma.cc after publication of a final product
behind a paywall or in book form. The benefits to society are more nebulous, considering the value of
Perma.cc long-term preservation.
D.

The Nature of the Work

Copyright scholar, William Patry has noted in his treatise: “As the Second Circuit observed,
citing this treatise, the second factor has rarely played a significant role in the determination of a fair use
dispute.”135 However, we must consider the nature of the works as part of a thorough analysis.
For our purposes, the works in question may be website pages, online government reports, news
and blog articles, articles in preprints, unpublished book chapters, PowerPoints, audio/visual files, and in
fact any type of material found on the web.136 Traditionally, factor two favors copyright owners if the
works are unpublished or if the works are more creative than nonfictional.
1.

Publication

Can a work be available on the Web and unpublished? Nimmer summarizes the law:
“Publication” was a term of art under the 1909 Act. The relevant decisions under this enactment
indicated that publication occurred when, by consent of the copyright owner, the original or
tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given away, or otherwise made available to the
general public, or when an authorized offer is made to dispose of the work in any such manner,
even if a sale or other such disposition does not in fact occur.137
This definition is traditionally used in cases dealing with the issue of whether general publication has
occurred under the 1909 Copyright Act, thereby forcing some works into the public domain. It is not
required after January 1, 1978.138 However, the definition does give us some insight in how courts might
rule on the question of whether materials on the Web are published—they are made available to the
general public and are not placed in a private archive as in the famous Salinger case.139
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For web materials that vanish altogether, with no way to obtain them, the Senate Report to the
1976 Copyright Act provides guidance:
Availability of the work.—A key, though not necessarily determinative, factor in fair use is
whether or not the work is available to the potential user. If the work is “out of print” and
unavailable for purchase through normal channels, the user may have more justification for
reproducing it than in the ordinary case, but the existence of organizations licensed to provide
photocopies of out-of-print works at reasonable cost is a factor to be considered. The
applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works is narrowly limited since although the
work is unavailable, this is the deliberate choice on the part of the copyright owner. Under
ordinary circumstances the copyright owner’s “right of first publication” would outweigh any
needs of reproduction for classroom purposes.140
On the one hand, the Senate Report seems to support findings of fair use for “out of print” works, which
by analogy would seem to suggest that materials from the Web that have become completely unavailable
are fair use for reproduction. However, the Senate Report goes on to recognize that this unavailability
may be due to “deliberate choice” of the copyright owner. Then the report further bolsters the rights of
copyright owners, preferring their “right of first publication” over reproduction in classroom use. Now, I
have argued above, that placement on the Web is a form of publication, but if not, then works, initially
placed on the Web that have gone on to be published by a publisher must constitute “first publication,”
and the law might frown upon archived Perma.cc documents that had first circumvented that publication.
Where copyright law fails us is to adequately deal with works that have “gone out publication,”
for lack of a better term, by no longer being accessible. Nimmer opines, “the fact that a work is out of
print cannot mean that its copyright becomes vitiated.”141 Some works, such as serial magazines, are
designed to go out of print.142 But the Web has presented a whole new scenario. It is an ever-changing
type face and, from a historical perspective, has the same durability as writing words in sand. Preserving
those moments of publication is a unique problem. Authors may have perverse incentives to indefinitely
preserving works in permanent, freely accessible form on the Web. For scholars, who should be
incentivized to rely on such works, the lack of stability is deeply problematic for their writings. Some
balance of technological solutions (such as Perma.cc and the Internet Archive)143 and law needs to be
achieved. Perhaps, scholars should be given special license for preserving web materials in archives such
as Perma.cc. On the other hand, perhaps no more should be preserved than is necessary to substantiate
the citation—something which Perma.cc does not currently facilitate.144
2.

Informational v. Creative Works

Informational works may be more freely published under caselaw. For example, in a Second
Circuit case, the court found: “The work in question was avowedly informational, and such works may be
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more freely published under Section 107 than those of a creative nature.”145 Many works on the Web
may be thought of as informational, but the analysis is more subtle.146 Courts have recognized that
copying the expression of otherwise informational works may not favor the defendant under fair use
analysis.147 Informational works containing “evaluative, analytical, or subjectively descriptive material
that surpasses the bare facts necessary to communicate information , or [which] derives from the author's
experiences or opinions,” may actually favor protection and the copyright owners under fair use analysis
of the second factor.148 Thus, even if web materials archived by Perma.cc are informational, there are
many aspects of such works that courts may rule as favoring the plaintiffs pertaining to the second factor
of fair use.
Only on an ad hoc basis can this factor be adequately evaluated. Hence, coming up with a
general observation about its application to potential cases involving Perma.cc is not possible.
E.

Amount and Substantiality of Copying

As to the amount of copying, de minims amounts may excuse the defendant from liability, but
outside that realm, the courts do not accord an exacting standard.
Like all the fair use factors, it has no precise threshold below which the factor is accorded
decisive significance. If the amount copied is very slight in relation to the work as a whole, the
third factor might strongly favor the alleged infringer, but that will not always be the case.149
Perma.cc archives entire web pages, documents, and other file types. It is unlikely that this factor will
favor Perma.cc or its users during fair use analysis.
Confirming that determination, consider the recent Second Circuit opinion in Fox News Network
v. TVEyes that recognizes there is not categorical rule against copying entire works:
This factor clearly favors Fox because TVEyes makes available virtually the entirety of the Fox
programming that TVEyes users want to see and hear. While “courts have rejected any
categorical rule that a copying of the entirety cannot be a fair use,” “a finding of fair use is [less]
likely . . . when the copying is extensive, or encompasses the most important parts of the
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original.” . . . . In this respect, the TVEyes Watch function is radically dissimilar to the service at
issue in Google Books.150
The opinion then goes on through extensive analysis of the Google Book “snippet function” to show that
no more than is necessary is copied.151 There is no “snippet function” here to limit the web material to
what is necessary for purposes of the citation.
To be thorough, this third factor also considers the substantiality of the copying, the most famous
case being Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises.152 The Supreme Court agreed with the
District Court that the Nation took the “heart” President Ford’s memoirs in a “news scoop” even though it
took only 300 words from the 200,000 word book.153 It is even harder to argue that archiving the whole
web page, news article, document, or file does not also include the heart of the work. This factor would
weigh against Perma.cc and its users.
F.

Summation of Fair Use Factors

As often is the case, analysis of fair use is unsatisfactory. The myriad of balancing factors,
opposing assumptions, and subtle interpretations in caselaw, make this an uncertain task. However,
assuming that the fourth factor, “effect upon the potential market” must weigh most heavily, and affect
our analysis of the other factors, we must look to it for guidance. Unfortunately, the elements of the best
theory—market failure—for justifying archival preservation as a solution to linkrot do not all favor
Perma.cc. In support of Perma.cc is that it is an answer to market failure of the Web to provide a
comprehensive solution to linkrot for citations to the web materials in scholarly articles. Perma.cc is
socially desirable. Of course, many materials on the Web are in the public domain, and some copyright
owners may welcome Perma.cc archiving, which would otherwise burden them. But, even assuming
most Web materials are of little economic value, there may be substantial economic harm to a few
copyright owners of web materials that seek to license materials once made freely available. Finally,
copyright owners of web materials that have migrated behind pay walls are willing to license their works,
but on the other hand, it is doubtful that such owners would work with others to provide a comprehensive,
licensed solution for anything on the Web like Perma.cc offers. How are we to judge, this most weighty
of all factors? In the end, we must conclude that there is no clear path to fair use in consideration of the
fourth factor, except as may be found on an ad hoc basis—we must subject each item in the Perma.cc
archive to analysis. It is no wonder that Perma.cc’s license agreement shifts copyright compliance
responsibilities to registrars and end users.154 But this is a system in which mistakes will be made—there
will be infringement.
The first factor, the nature of the use, at first blush is educational (although in some cases,
Perma.cc-linked materials may be used in court documents). However, the questions about “payment of
the customary price” and exploitation of copyrighted material do not easily dismiss themselves. Law
reviews, journals, and court papers are giving value to their readers through the use of Perma.cc links.
Legal scholars, judges, and lawyers are benefiting. If there were limitations on the types of materials
being used—federal government reports—the uses would be noncommercial, but such sources constitute
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a fraction of the Web. One issue is whether the use of a website, which otherwise has no value, for
scholarly purposes gives it economic value for which a price must be paid. But this is exactly the
circularity Nimmer warned us against. Another is whether the use of materials that migrate behind
paywalls is a commercial use for which the customary price must be paid. Again, we rapidly find
ourselves in the fourth factor’s analysis of effects on potential markets. That analysis gave us no clear
path to fair use.
We have already introduced the nature of the work into our analysis. It is safe to assume that
works on the Web satisfy the publication requirement, so violating a right of first publication is not an
issue. We may also assume that most of the works are informational; hence, their value for scholarship.
But informational resources are not devoid of “evaluative, analytical, or subjectively descriptive material”
and may contain authors’ opinions as well. There is such a wide range of material on the Web, it is
impossible to make generalizations, and we should only apply the test on an ad hoc basis, which we
cannot do here.
Perma.cc archives entire works—web pages, news articles, government reports and other
materials, including a variety of file types. It is not set up to glean the snippet of information that is
necessary to justify the scholarly citation in a footnote. It captures the whole page, because that is what
the technology does—in both Web ARChive (WARC) or screenshot formats. The information is useful
for checking law review and journal citations to web sources, but in many instances, more information
than is actually necessary may be captured.
A reader of an earlier draft of this work, criticizes the analysis from finding liability for a lack of
fair use as a “tower of suppositions.” Beginning with there must be a plaintiff crazy enough to sue (and
not just request that material be taken down),155 the critic found a finding of lack of fair use to be one
supposition after another—in the whole, being unlikely. It is argued that risk of copyright liability had to
be minimal under these circumstances. But this is the nature of fair use analysis. Fair use analysis is
always about factors, each with their own suppositions, which like tumblers of a lock must align to either
support or deny fair use.
In summation, only on an ad hoc basis can any firm conclusions be drawn. But there is no clearly
demarcated route to establishing fair use for general use of Perma.cc. Consequently, by turning over
policy making to registrars, Perma.cc has shed the laborious task of deciding what can go into its
archives,156 but registrars, end-users, and ultimately, the readers of scholarly works may be saddled with
an onerous, case-by-case task. Individual end users are in the best position to judge the facts and issues
for themselves, but they (even with law backgrounds) are less likely to be adept at navigating the
specialized legal knowledge of copyright required without considerable education in the subject—a role
which registrars must take on.

155
For most owners of works cited by Perma.cc, if indeed unhappy with the archiving, the ease of the
takedown process should satisfy them. However, in the recent Internet Archive litigation, publishers (Hachette
Book Group, Inc., HarperCollins, LLC, Wiley & Sons, Inc., and Penguin Random House LLC) were not satisfied
with the option of takedown requests. See supra notes 89 through 90 and accompanying text. If Perma.cc “scales
up” to more journals and more disciplines, the risk from litigious publishers increases. The risk also increases with
pending legislation to create a copyright “small claims court.” See infra notes 238 through 244 and accompanying
text.
156

That said, Perma.cc may be directly liable for infringing because it, not its users, makes copies of Web
materials (although at the instruction of users). See infra note 213. It thus violates the reproduction right of
copyright owners under 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-152).

30

IV.

Library Exemptions from Liability Under 17 U.S.C. § 108

At its heart Perma.cc is run by libraries—not just the Library Innovation Library at Harvard Law
School, but a network of library partners across the world that act as registrars of users.157
Responsibilities for library registrars include educating users and even set policies for use of the
archive.158 Thus, Harvard is transferring the responsibility for determining appropriate use of the archive
(including copyright) to its network registrars. This should give library registrars pause when considering
potential for copyright abuses.
It must be noted that a specific section of the copyright code deals with exemptions for libraries
and their users—17 U.S.C. § 108.159 The general problem for libraries, under the code section, is that
they are only allowed to make archival copies of what they actually have in their collection.160 Neither
Harvard’s law library nor registrant libraries are likely to own the web materials that users contribute to
the Perma.cc archive (although it is possible). Also problematic is several of § 108’s provisions require
that the “copy . . . becomes the property of the user . . . .”161 Perma.cc’s Terms of Service do not specify
who owns the copy of the original web material that is in its archive, although the user has control over it
(and other users at the same institution may see “Perma Records”).162 Nimmer observes, “Section 108
provides that the exemption does not apply to musical works, to pictorial, graphic or sculptural works, or
to motion pictures or other audiovisual works.”163 Users might archive an assortment of file types (and
consequently media) with Perma.cc. All in all, § 108 offers no escape from infringement for the libraries
and users associated with Perma.cc, nor is it of help to Harvard Law Library and Perma.cc.

V.
Liability for Perma.cc and Registrars under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), Contributory
Infringement and Vicarious Liability
At some point readers may think that the specter of Perma.cc and its end users being hauled into
court is unlikely because of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s notice-and-takedown provisions of
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17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).164 However effective and inexpensive for copyright owners of web materials to
find remedy under the notice-and-takedown provisions,165 they have other potential remedies against
Perma.cc grounded in the theories of contributory infringement and vicarious liability when defendants
fail to comply with § 512(c)(1)(A) and (B). These sections provide cover for third-party service
providers, like Perma.cc, that post infringing material at the direction their end users. However, that
cover is limited and addresses theories of contributory infringement and vicarious liability, without even
mentioning the defense articulated by the Supreme Court in Sony, referred to as the “staple doctrine” or
“substantial non-infringing uses.”166
A.

Perma.cc and Contributory Infringement under § 512(c)

Various provisions operate in concert to offer protection for contributory infringement and
vicarious liability under § 512(c). This section will explore this code provision, as well as report on
litigation in the Second Circuit that may be key to its interpretation, while at the same time undermining
its effective implementation.
1.

How the DMCA Works to Protect Internet Service Providers

Section 512(c)(1)(A) is based on contributory infringement. That theory requires contribution to
the infringement and knowledge, actual or constructive, of infringement of end users of products or
services. Section 512(c)(1)(A) is based on that theory and allows escape for “service providers”167 like
Perma.cc if it:
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(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the
system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material . . . .168
Clause (iii) is not the takedown provision that is generally spoken of with respect to the DMCA. That is
found in § 512(c)(1)(C) and (c)(3). What is important to note is that Perma.cc has a duty to expeditiously
remove items that it knows is infringing under clause (i), or if it has red flag knowledge under clause (ii).
The plain reading of the statute is that this duty obligates Perma.cc regardless of whether there is a notice
from copyright owners.
The Second Circuit in Viacom Int’l v. YouTube, Inc. interprets the knowledge requirement of
clause (i) to require knowledge of “specific infringing activity”:
In particular, we are persuaded that the basic operation of § 512(c) requires knowledge or
awareness of specific infringing activity. Under § 512(c)(1)(A), knowledge or awareness alone
does not disqualify the service provider; rather, the provider that gains knowledge or awareness
of infringing activity retains safe-harbor protection if it “acts expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). Thus, the nature of the removal obligation
itself contemplates knowledge or awareness of specific infringing material because expeditious
removal is possible only if the service provider knows with particularity which items to remove.
Indeed, to require expeditious removal in the absence of specific knowledge or awareness would
be to mandate an amorphous obligation to “take commercially reasonable steps” in response to a
generalized awareness of infringement. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of
the statute, which requires “expeditious[ ]” action to remove or disable “the material” at issue. 17
U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).169
Thus, the knowledge Perma.cc has to have is of “specific infringing activity.” At the same time, the
Second Circuit ruled that under 512(m), Perma.cc has no duty to monitor for infringing activity.170

(A) As used in subsection (a), the term “service provider” means an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or
among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the
content of the material as sent or received.
(B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term “service provider” means a
provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an
entity described in subparagraph (A).
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With regard to “red flag knowledge” in § 512(c)(1)(C)(ii), it also requires specific knowledge, but
that depends on “whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific
infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”171
Without having a duty to monitor its archive, what might operatives of Perma.cc be aware of or
know that would subject it to liability or a duty to “takedown” under § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) or (ii)? Aggrieved
parties (whose content was infringed by end users of Perma.cc), rather than resorting to the notice-andtakedown scheme of § 512(c)(1)(C), could bring an action in line with § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) or (ii), which
would permit discovery to determine the specific knowledge (either actual or “red flag”) of Perma.cc’s
operators. Most plaintiffs may be content with “takedown” procedures under § 512(c)(1)(C), but
determined content owners might allege third-party liability without protection of § 512(c)(1)(A) (and
consequently without any cover of § 512(c)) because Perma.cc operators had the requisite level of
knowledge.
2.

The Failure of Viacom’s Litigation and its Consequences

An example of such a case is Viacom International v. YouTube. In that case, YouTube principals
were aware of numerous instances of infringing content on their site, but took no action. YouTube
employees had conducted website surveys showing that 75-80% of all content was copyrighted
material.172 Credit Suisse, advisor to Google, “estimated that more than 60% of copyrighted premium
content” of which only 10% was authorized.173 Internal YouTube communications showed a YouTube
executive requested that infringing material from “Premier League” soccer be taken down ahead of
meetings with sports leagues to bid for Premier League rights. Internal YouTube reports by co-founder
Jawed Karim disclosed that the shows Family Guy, South Park, MTV cribs, Daily Show, Reno 911 and
Dave Chapelle were available on YouTube. The Second Circuit cited this in its opinion that jurors could
find the requisite knowledge under § 512(c)(1)(A):
Karim further opined that, "although YouTube is not legally required to monitor content . . . and
complies with DMCA takedown requests, we would benefit from preemptively removing content
that is blatantly illegal and likely to attract criticism." He also noted that "a more thorough
analysis" of the issue would be required. At least some of the TV shows to which Karim referred
are owned by Viacom. A reasonable juror could conclude from the March 2006 report that Karim
knew of the presence of Viacom-owned material on YouTube, since he presumably located
specific clips of the shows in question before he could announce that YouTube hosted the content
"[a]s of today." A reasonable juror could also conclude that Karim believed the clips he located to
be infringing (since he refers to them as “blatantly illegal”), and that YouTube did not remove the
content from the website until conducting “a more thorough analysis,” thus exposing the
company to liability in the interim.174

common law cause of action for willful blindness intact, but without obligating YouTube to a duty to monitor. See
id. at 39-40.
171

Id. at 31.
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Id. at 33.
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Id.

174

Id. (emphasis added).
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YouTube executives also had knowledge of infringing Bud Light commercials, but co-founder Stephen
Chen, argued, “can we please leave these in a bit longer? another [sic] week or two can’t hurt.”175
What appears to have happened is that YouTube executives waited for a takedown notice under §
512(c)(1)(C),176 when they already, arguably, had the requisite knowledge obliging them to take down the
material on their own initiative under § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), at least if they wanted to preserve their
exemption from liability. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the order granting summary
judgment from below, and instructed the “District Court to determine on remand whether any specific
infringements of which YouTube had knowledge or awareness correspond to the clips-in-suit in these
actions.”177
On remand, the New York Southern District Court again ruled for summary judgment in favor of
the defendants. How is this possible? The District court ordered the parties to answer for each clip-insuit: “what precise information was given to or reasonably apparent to YouTube identifying the location
or site of the infringing matter?”178 From that, the District Court interpreted the knowledge of “specific
infringements” to depend upon identification of the clips-in-suit, with the burden on the plaintiffs.
Because the web location of clips-in-suit was never identified by evidence uncovered from YouTube,179
in part, as a function of the “volume of material,” the court found that Viacom lacked sufficient proof, and
after considering other issues,180 ruled for summary judgment in favor of YouTube.181
175

Id. at 33-34.
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See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 119 (S.D.N.Y. April 18, 2013).

YouTube's founders decided to “take down whole movies,” “entire TV shows, like an entire family guy
episode” (id.), “South Park, and full length anime episodes,” “nudity/porn and any death videos,” but to
leave up “music videos,” “news programs,” (E-mail from Brent Hurley to Cuong Do dated Nov. 24, 2005),
“sports, commercials” (E-mails between Jawed Karim, Steve Chen, and Chad Hurley dated Sept. 3, 2005),
and “comedy clips (Conan, Leno, etc.)” (E-mail from Jawed Karim to Steve Chen dated Sept. 1, 2005).
YouTube then “disabled community flagging for infringement” (Viacom Opp. at 41), declined to develop a
feature “to send automated email alerts to copyright owners when illegal content was uploaded” (Viacom
2010 Br. at 11), and eventually stopped regularly monitoring its site for infringements, deciding instead “to
keep substantially all infringing videos on the site as a draw to users, unless and until YouTube received a
‘takedown notice’ from the actual copyright owner identifying a specific infringing clip by URL and
demanding its removal from the site.”
Id. (emphasis added).
177

Viacom, 676 F.3d, at 34.

178

Viacom, 940 F. Supp. 2d, 113 (emphasis added).
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See id.

Pursuant to the first item, I requested the parties to report, for each clip-in-suit, "what precise information
was given to or reasonably apparent to YouTube identifying the location or site of the infringing matter?"
(Tr. Oct. 12, 2012, p. 29) YouTube submitted a list of 63,060 clips-in-suit, claimed it never received
adequate notices of any of those infringements, and challenged plaintiffs to fill in the blanks specifying
how they claim such notice was given.
Id.
180

Willful blindness is the other issue taken up on remand by the District Court. It applies the “specific
infringement” standard to willful blindness as well. “As shown by the Court of Appeals' discussion of ‘red flags,’
under the DMCA, what disqualifies the service provider from the DMCA's protection is blindness to ‘specific and
identifiable instances of infringement.’” Id. at 116.
181

See id. at 114-15
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In effect, the District Court eviscerated the requirement for YouTube to take down infringing
material on its own initiative under § 512(c)(1)(A), and conflated it with § 512(c)(1)(C). It suggested as
much stating, “If, as plaintiffs' assert, neither side can determine the presence or absence of specific
infringements because of the volume of material, that merely demonstrates the wisdom of the legislative
requirement that it be the owner of the copyright, or his agent, who identifies the infringement by giving
the service provider notice. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(3)(A).”182 What is wrong with this statement is the notice
requirement comes from § 512(c)(1)(C) and, given the plain reading of the statute, is not required in §
512(c)(3)(A). The District Court got it wrong: the code does obligate internet service providers to take
down infringing material in certain instances without the notice from the aggrieved party. The litigation
trail ends when the District Court denied plaintiff’s motion to certify a very large class against
YouTube.183
The Southern District of New York’s penultimate decision in Viacom may turn out to be an
outlier, but did the court have any choice? Given the instructions from the Second Circuit to apply
knowledge of “specific infringing activity”184 to § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii), the centrality of “clips-insuit,”185 and the sheer volume of evidence (none of which tied clips-in-suit with identifying and location
information to Viacom and YouTube), the court’s application of a notice requirement to § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)
and (ii)186 on Viacom (as well as placing the burden of proof on Viacom)187 may be inescapable as a
matter of judicial expediency. Other courts may follow. However, even without specifically identifying
Viacom, copyright owner’s frustration with § 512(c) is palpable and has been documented by a recent
Copyright Office Report criticizing the shift in the statute’s interpretation to favor online service
providers.188 There is an inconsistency in the way § 512(c) is written and how it has been applied. That
dissonance favors archives like Perma.cc.
At least in the Federal Southern District of New York, the lesson for Perma.cc from the Viacom
litigation is that online archives, in their role as internet service providers, can elect a policy to wait for
takedown notices without losing safe-harbor protection, regardless of what they may know about
infringing content. The knowledge requirement of § 512(c)(1)(A) has been conflated with § 512(c)(1)(C).
182

Id. at 115 (emphasis added).

183
Football Ass'n Premier League v. Youtube, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 64, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The District Court
opens its opinion skeptically:

The putative class consists of every person and entity in the world who own infringed copyrighted works,
who have or will register them with the U.S. Copyright Office as required, whose works fall into either of
two categories: they were the subject of prior infringement which was blocked by YouTube after notice,
but suffered additional infringement through subsequent uploads (the "repeat infringement class"), or are
musical compositions which defendants tracked, monetized or identified and allowed to be used without
proper authorization (the "music publisher class"). Plaintiffs assert that there are “at least thousands of class
members” in the Repeat Infringement Class, and “hundreds” in the Music Publisher Class.
Id (citations omitted).
184

See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012).
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See Viacom, 940 F. Supp. at 113.
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See id. at 115.
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See id.
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UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17, at 77-83 (May 2020),
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-report.pdf (finds § 512 unbalanced and in favor of
online service providers).
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Whether all of the notice requirements of the latter apply to the former is an issue for another day, except
we may be certain that the location of the offending content continues to be a requirement.189
As with Viacom v. YouTube, for Perma.cc volume is already an issue making knowledge of
specific infringing activity, ownership, and location less likely. As of this writing, Permalink has
preserved 1,685,273 links with 47,936 end users.190 Between Perma.cc’s volume of links and number of
end users, there are certainly infringing uses, but of which does Perma.cc have any specific knowledge?
If it gets a takedown notice, Perma.cc acts under the terms of its copyright policy to remove the
material.191 But more on that issue later.192
The parties that are most likely to have knowledge of specific infringing activities are Perma.cc’s
registrars, since they set policy for their end users, with respect to archiving content.193 They also can see
what is archived by Perma.cc at the direction of users.194 Potential liability for registrars is discussed
below.195
In addition, although lacking a duty to monitor, Perma.cc may still be liable for common law
willful blindness within the parameters set forth by the Second Circuit in Viacom.196
B.

The Staple Doctrine of “Substantial Non-Infringing Uses”

An additional issue related to contributory infringement is whether the staple doctrine of
exemption from liability for technologies with “substantial non-infringing uses” from Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios applies,197 or whether it has been abrogated by the § 512(c)(1)(A), at least with
respect to online service providers? Per Viacom, “As a general matter, we interpret a statute to abrogate a
common law principle only if the statute ‘speak[s] directly to the question addressed by the common
law.’”198 Furthermore, the court in Viacom was considering the common law doctrine of willful

189

See Viacom 940 F. Supp. 2d, at 113.
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PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc (last visited June 9, 2020). On a similar scale, Viacom v. YouTube in the
penultimate case before the District Court involved “63,060 clips-in-suit” for which YouTube had never received
“adequate notice” of infringement. Viacom, 940 F. Supp. at 113.
191

Copyright Policy, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/copyright-policy (last visited June 9, 2020).
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See infra section V.C.
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See Perma.cc user guide/For Registrars, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/docs/libraries#libraries-authority
(last visited May 28, 2020).
194
Supporting this is the fact that Registrars have access to “Private Records” (records of archived web
materials that have a “noarchive” metatag) created by Perma.cc. See Perma.cc user guide/Perma Records & Links,
PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/docs/perma-link-creation#private-records (last visited May 28, 2020).
195

See infra V.D.
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See supra note 170. On remand to District Court for the Southern District Court of New York, the court
found no liability for willful blindness for the specific “clips-in-suit,” no evidence of inducement, and that YouTube
was protected under 17 U.S.C.A. 512 (c). Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 117, 121, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449, (1984) (Blackmun dissenting),
superseded by statute, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2877, as recognized in
Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
198

Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9,
14 (2d Cir. 2009)). See also United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534, 113 S. Ct. 1631, 1634 (1993).
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blindness, and not liability for contributory infringement (which is clearly addressed by § 512(c)(1)(A)),
when it discussed abrogation.199
In MGM Studios v. Grokster, in 2005, well after the adoption of the DMCA in 1998, the Supreme
Court dismissed the staple exemption because of the defendants’ knowledge of infringement (which rose
to the level of inducement).200 However, it did not dismiss the doctrine as abrogated by §512(c). Several
other courts have considered § 512(c) safe harbors while considering defendant’s plea for exemptions
under the staple doctrine, but some with only minimal analysis of “substantial non-infringing uses” except
to cite Sony or Grokster.201 Nimmer writes, “Section 512 limits liability for that conduct to such an extent
that it becomes scarcely relevant how the affected conduct would fare under Sony.”202 Regardless of
Nimmer’s concerns about the relevancy of Sony, the Senate Report accompanying the DMCA Act makes
clear that existing defenses from infringement in the law apply.
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Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35.

200

MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935 (2005) (“Thus, where evidence goes beyond a
product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions
directed to promoting infringement, Sony's staple-article rule will not preclude liability.”).
201
EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 2016) (jury’s finding of
“red flag” knowledge under § 512(c) was proper—reversing trial court, and “substantial non-infringing uses” not
applied as a defense because of inducement), cert. denied Robertson v. EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc., 137 S. Ct.
2269 (2017); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Gary Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1031-32, 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013)
(affirming summary judgment on behalf of the plaintiffs based on § 512(c) analysis, and only referencing
“substantial non-infringing uses” with respect to Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
442, (1984) (Blackmun dissenting), superseded by statute, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304,
112 Stat. 2877, as recognized in Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 941 (N.D.
Cal. 2009)), cert. dismissed Fung v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 571 U.S. 1007 (2013); UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Shelter Capital Partners Ltd. Liab. Co., 718 F.3d 1006, 1021-22, 1036 (9th Cir. 2013) (defendant entitled to safe
harbor protection of § 512(c), and referenced “substantial non-infringing uses” with respect to Sony 464 U.S. at 442
and A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001)); Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC,
972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 519-521, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applied 512(c) analysis, but referenced “substantial noninfringing uses” only with respect to Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933), reconsideration granted Capitol Records, LLC v.
Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d in part and vacated in part by remand, Capitol Records,
Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Vimeo, Ltd. Liab. Co., 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied Capitol Records, Ltd. Liab. Co. v.
Vimeo, Ltd. Liab. Co., 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016); Disney Enters. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIVWILLIAMS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172339, at *99, *110, *123, *158 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2013) (motion granted
for Plaintiff with regards to issue of Defendant’s § 512 defense, but summary judgment not granted with respect to
defense based on “substantial non-infringing uses and inducement) (“The fact that these questions remain makes
summary judgment [on contributory infringement] inappropriate on the theories of inducement and contributory
infringement liability. And while Hotfile may have a difficult time explaining its "innocence" to a jury, the genuine
issues of material fact must be resolved by a jury at trial.”); Arista Records LLC v. Myxer Inc., No. CV 08-03935
GAF (JCx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109668, at *92, *96-*98, *137-*38 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011) (Plaintiff’s
summary judgment motion to disqualify defendant’s 501(c) defense denied, and motion denied for contributory
infringement based on defendant’s evidence of “substantial non-infringing use”); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes,
LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 643-646, 649, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (defendant’s motion for summary judgment on its
defense under §512 (c) granted, except for failure to respond to takedown notices, but defense based on substantial
non-infringing uses failed); Arista Records LLC v. USENET.com, 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(defense based on “substantial non-infringing uses fails when defendant had continuing contact with users, and §
512(c) not applied as defense because of evidence lost or destroyed that would have illustrated defendant’s state of
mind).
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4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, at § 12A.19[B].
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Even if a service provider’s activities fall outside the limitations on liability specified in the bill,
the service provider is not necessarily an infringer; liability in these circumstances would be
adjudicated based on the doctrines of direct, vicarious or contributory liability for infringement as
they are articulated in the Copyright Act and in the court decisions interpreting and applying that
statute, which are unchanged by section 512. In the event that a service provider does not qualify
for the limitation on liability, it still may claim all of the defenses available to it under current
law. New section 512 simply defines the circumstances under which a service provider, as
defined in this Section, may enjoy a limitation on liability for copyright infringement.203
The weight of a Senate Report, which was not the Conference report, on judicial interpretation is always
subject to question, but the above statement clearly supports the continued application of the staple
doctrine and substantial non-infringing uses defense. Thus, in the event of suit, Perma.cc can still claim
the exemption of substantial non-infringing uses as a defense to traditional claims brought for
contributory infringement, although perhaps with diminished relevance per the operation of § 512(c).
C.

Perma.cc and Vicarious Liability under § 512(c)

Besides liability under § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii), the Second Circuit considered liability under §
512(c)(1)(B), which is essentially vicarious liability. The provision requires that the service provider,
“does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.”204 Perma.cc is receiving a financial
benefit from subscription fees of submitting authors who have individual memberships (lacking a library
or institutional registrar) and from non-academic registrars.205 In many cases, these fees may just serve as
a stimulus to encourage scholars to pressure their own libraries and institutions to register with Perma.cc,
but the fees are a benefit. Furthermore, non-academic institutions are paying “full freight.” Thus,
Perma.cc is financially benefitting, at least at first glance.
The Senate Report (from the Judiciary Committee) accompanying the original DMCA act makes
clear that in many instances, setup and periodic fees for the online service are acceptable and do not
negate the limitation of liability.
In determining whether the financial benefit criterion is satisfied, courts should take a commonsense, fact-based approach, not a formalistic one. In general, a service provider conducting a
legitimate business would not be considered to receive a “financial benefit directly attributable to
the infringing activity” where the infringer makes the same kind of payment as non-infringing
users of the provider’s service. Thus, receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat periodic payments
for service from a person engaging in infringing activities would not constitute receiving a
“financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.” Nor is subparagraph (B)
intended to cover fees based on the length of the message (per number of bytes, for example) or
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S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 44-45 (1998). See also H. Rep. No. 105-796 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (not
addressing the issue).
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17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(B) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-152).
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Courts are also excluded from paying subscription fees. See About Perma.cc, PERMA.CC,
https://perma.cc/about#accounts (last visited May 22, 2020). Personal subscriptions are offered at $10 per month for
ten links, $25 for 100 links, and $100 for 500 links. Settings, Subscription, PERMA.CC,
https://perma.cc/settings/subscription (last visited June 9, 2020)
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by connect time. It would however, include any such fees where the value of the service lies in
providing access to infringing material.206
At first glance, because Perma.cc’s users, whether infringing or non-infringing, would pay the same
subscription fee (as individual subscribers or non-academic institutions), the payment of periodic
subscription fees is not an issue. However, the real test is whether the value of Perma.cc “lies in
providing access to infringing material.” But Perma.cc’s real value is stopping linkrot and letting scholars
check each other’s citations to web materials, rather than serving as a “back channel” for infringing
material. If the Senate Report has any interpretive weight (the Conference Report does not address the
issue),207 Perma.cc’s monetary benefits can be ignored under § 512(c)(1)(B).
The next question is the right and ability to control under § 512(c)(1)(B). The Second Circuit, in
assessing the right and ability to control, states that it “requires something more than the ability to remove
or block access to materials posted on a service provider's website.”208 There is no knowledge
requirement in the subsection.209 The Ninth Circuit in a very similar video streaming case, UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, found that the defendant service provider’s use of
filtering did not constitute control.210 What then is that ability to control—that “something more” than
simply the right and ability to block or take down material? The Second Circuit in Viacom v. YouTube
clarified:
To date, only one court has found that a service provider had the right and ability to control
infringing activity under § 512(c)(1)(B). In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F.
Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002), the court found control where the service provider instituted a
monitoring program by which user websites received “detailed instructions regard[ing] issues of
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S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 44-45 (1998).
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See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 105-796 (1998) (Conf. Rep).
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Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 38 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v.
MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). On remand, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York found that YouTube did not have the right and ability to control infringing activity. Viacom
Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36.

210

UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners Ltd. Liab. Co., 718 F.3d 1006, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013).

We agree with the Second Circuit and hold that, in order to have the “right and ability to control,” the
service provider must “exert[]substantial influence on the activities of users.” “Substantial influence” may
include, as the Second Circuit suggested, high levels of control over activities of users, as in Cybernet. Or it
may include purposeful conduct, as in Grokster. In this case, Veoh's interactions with and conduct toward
its users did not rise to such a level. As Judge Matz recognized, “(a) the allegedly infringing material
resided on Veoh's system; (b) Veoh had the ability to remove such material; (c) Veoh could have
implemented, and did implement, filtering systems; and (d) Veoh could have searched for potentially
infringing content.” Such circumstances are not equivalent to the activities found to constitute substantial
influence in Cybernet and Grokster. Nor has UMG, in its initial or supplemental briefing to this court,
pointed to other evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Veoh's activities involved
“something more than the ability to remove or block access to materials posted on a service provider's
website.”
Id. at 1030 (citations omitted). Like Perma.cc, the defendant changed the format of the content (video) that it was
uploading. “Veoh's software also automatically converts, or ‘transcodes,’ the video file into Flash 7 format. This is
done because ‘the vast majority of internet users have software that can play videos’ in this format. Veoh presets the
requisite settings for the Flash conversion” Id. at 1012. Thus, changing formats for storage is not an issue.
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layout, appearance, and content.” Id. at 1173. The service provider also forbade certain types of
content and refused access to users who failed to comply with its instructions. Id. Similarly,
inducement of copyright infringement under Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 162 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2005), which “premises liability on
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct,” id. at 937, might also rise to the level of control
under § 512(c)(1)(B). Both of these examples involve a service provider exerting substantial
influence on the activities of users, without necessarily—or even frequently—acquiring
knowledge of specific infringing activity.211
The facts in Perfect 10 case does not square with Perma.cc, which is not monitoring the “layout,
appearance, and content” of submitted content, nor are there any facts to suggest inducement of
infringement.
However, there are four possible reasons why Perma.cc might meet this Viacom test “of
something more” than the right and ability to takedown material, thus demonstrating control. First, it
should be remembered that it is Perma.cc that harvests web materials after being directed to do so by the
end user.212 The user never uploads the content from his or her computer; instead, Perma.cc “grabs” the
content from the Web. Second, Perma.cc makes available the material both in the “capture” format and
as a screenshot.213 Third, Perma.cc has determined to archive pages with “noarchive” metatags, although
with restricted access to users and their organizations.214 Fourth, Perma.cc has set in place a system of
registrars whose duty is to enforce policies and practices, “ensuring that those in [their] network[s] do not
abuse their accounts.”215 Certainly, copyright compliance is one of those issues for abuse.216 Perma.cc is
performing actions that look like control. The question is whether in doing so it fails to qualify for
general exemption as a service provider (for “information residing on systems or networks at directions of
users”)217 from liability by operation of § 512(c)(1)(B).
The facts of Perma.cc’s operation run uncomfortably close to a pre-DMCA case, Polygram Int'l
Publ'g, Inc. v. Nev./TIG, Inc., which also turned on the issue of control.218 Polygram can be distinguished
as not being an Internet case--specifically, not involving internet service providers that would fall under §
211

Viacom, 676 F.3d at 47-48.
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See About Perma.cc, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/about#how-perma-works (“Users go to the Perma.cc
website and input a URL. Perma.cc downloads the material at that URL and gives back a new URL (a “Perma.cc
link”) that can then be inserted in a paper, article, blog or whatever the author needs.”) (last visited May 20, 2020).
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See Perma.cc user guide Perma Records & Links, Perma.cc, https://perma.cc/docs/perma-linkcreation#preservation-formats (last visited May 22, 2020). The “capture” format uses Web ARChive (or “warc”).
See Web ARChive, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_ARChive (last visited May 22, 2022). It is
widely used in web harvesting and “web crawls.” Id.
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See Perma.cc user guide: Perma Records & Links, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/docs/perma-linkcreation#private-records (last visited June 9, 2020).
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Perma.cc user guide/For Registrars, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/docs/libraries#libraries-authority (last
visited June 9, 2020). Registrars can also set their own policies and best practices. Id. Registrars and end users can
change access of permalinks to private viewing only. See Perma.cc user guide: Perma Records & Links, PERMA.CC,
https://perma.cc/docs/perma-link-creation#private-records (last visited June 9, 2020).
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See supra note 8.
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See heading to 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-152) and text of (c)(1) (exempting
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855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994).
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512(c). However, the Polygram case puts to forefront the central issue: who should be at risk for
copyright violations when an organization, benefiting from infringing copyright, fails to enforce its own
rules? The current answer may be that the DMCA §512(c), at least as interpreted in Viacom, has
fundamentally changed the balance in favor of online service providers, and placed the burden of risk on
copyright owners. It should not surprise us then that copyright owners demand changes in the DMCA.219
The issue of control is vital to determining Perma.cc’s liability under the theory of contributory
infringement. It is uncertain at best. However, Perma.cc’s ability to remove or block content, by itself, is
not enough to establish control and resulting liability.
D.

§ 512(c) and (d) Protection from Liability and Registrars

Perma.cc has been prudent in placing the responsibility on registrars or partner organizations to
set policies for its users.220 The registrars stand between Perma.cc and its end users. However, this
arrangement creates questions as to whether registrars, assuming suit under theories of contributory or
vicarious liability, can benefit from the protections of § 512(c). For instance, the takedown notices are
handled by Perma.cc, not the registrars, or end users.221 Consequently, why would § 512(c) apply to
registrars? While registrars may not receive takedown notices, they can act preemptively to preserve
protection under § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) and remove or block access to material they know to be infringing.222
The question is whether such action is necessary prior to a takedown notice given the results of the
Viacom litigation.223
The issue of registrars’ status under § 512, and whether they could find shelter under § 512(c)
was raised in the Introduction.224 To conclude the analysis, we must look at § 512(k). Regardless of their
role in notice-and-takedown procedures, there is also some question about whether library registrars are
“service providers” that may benefit from the notice-and-takedown provisions of § 512(c).
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See supra note 188 and accompanying text. The EU has sought to rebalance the relationship between
online service providers and copyright owners by mandating filtering of uploaded content. See Directive 2019/790
of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 April 2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single
Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L130) 92, 119, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019L0790 (hereinafter, “EU Copyright Directive”). However,
Nonprofit educational repositories are generally exempt as online content-service providers.
Providers of services, such as not-for-profit online encyclopedias, not-for-profit educational and scientific
repositories, open source software-developing and-sharing platforms, providers of electronic
communications services as defined in Directive (EU) 2018/1972, online marketplaces, business-tobusiness cloud services and cloud services that allow users to upload content for their own use, are not
‘online content-sharing service providers’ within the meaning of this Directive.
Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
220

Perma.cc user guide/For Registrars, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/docs/libraries#libraries-authority (last
visited May 22, 2020) (“As a registrar, you'll help train and support Perma.cc users within your network and you'll
be the main point of contact between your network and the Perma team. That means you are the main point of
contact for questions from your Perma users regarding policies and practices.”).
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Copyright Policy, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/copyright-policy.
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Registrars have the capability to set permalinks to “private” access. See Perma.cc user guide: Perma
Records & Links, Perma.cc, https://perma.cc/docs/perma-link-creation#private-records (last visited June 12, 2020).
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(1) Service provider.—
(A) As used in subsection (a), the term “service provider” means an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications,
between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without
modification to the content of the material as sent or received.
(B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term “service provider” means
a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and
includes an entity described in subparagraph (A).225
Arguably, library registrars partner with and provide Perma.cc “network” access to its Perma.cc users and
are thus “service providers,” but it is Perma.cc that is the real network, and whether registrars of networks
are treated as service providers under § 512(c) is untested in litigation.
Even assuming registrars qualify, they do not have a role in the notice-and-takedown process.
For example, where does a law library registrar place its DMCA takedown notice, as required under § 512
(c)(3)? Is the general university DMCA notice that universities put on all web pages, including their law
library’s pages, sufficient to pick up Perma.cc links in law reviews and journals, or should such notices be
placed in the law reviews and journals themselves (especially electronic formats)? What about the
requirement of having a designated DMCA agent under § 512(c)(2)? Do law reviews and journals using
Perma.cc links need to list this information for their registrars to gain protection? Running parallel to §
512(c) is subsection (d), which covers linked information under the same standards as subparagraph (c),
which deals with archived information. Finally, shouldn’t registrar libraries and institutions be required
to abide by § 512(i) requirements to “adopt[] and reasonably implement[], and inform[] subscribers and
account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination
in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or
network who are repeat infringers”?226
Simply relying on the steps Perma.cc takes may be insufficient to protect registrars. It is unlikely
that law libraries would even receive a takedown notice under § 512(c)(1)(C), (g). How can they claim
shelter under § 512(c) by Perma.cc’s actions, even though they are registrars and listed as “Perma.cc’s
Partners”?227 Section 512 simply doesn’t cover the situation. Beyond academic law libraries, do courts
or other institutional registrars (whether or not academic) meet DMCA § 512 requirements? It may not
even be on their radar.
Examining § 512(d), which covers linking instead of archiving or storing information, our
analysis needs to consider whether linking to Perma.cc (and possibly institutions hosting digital law
reviews and journals) may be protected under the same schema as § 512(c), we need to apply the
following:
(d) Information location tools.--A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or,
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of
copyright by reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location containing
infringing material or infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a
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17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-152) (emphasis added).
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227

About Perma.cc, PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/about#perma-partners (last visited May 22, 2020).
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directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link, if the service provider—[repeat of
exceptions for (c)].228
Again the definition of service provider is key,229 but especially within the context of “referring” or
“hypertext linking.” It is hard to imagine a publisher of a print law journal with Perma.cc links trying to
take shelter under § 512(d), and fitting within that provision. However, many journals are now published
in PDF formats online hosted at their school’s website and elsewhere.230 The perhaps unlikely issue is by
making available law reviews and journals on their websites and using Perma.cc are host institutions
exposing themselves to liability for failing to respond to takedown notices for Perma.cc links to infringing
copies of archived materials? Furthermore, do host institutions risk liability when they have actual or
“red flag” knowledge of links to infringing material within these law reviews and journals?
These may seem remote risks, but concurrent with writing this article, I had another article being
published by AALL’s Law Library Journal. In the page proofs the editors, without my asking, added 50
Perma.cc links and made Perma.cc archival copies all of my web linked citations. These citations were
almost entirely journal articles and book chapters from other fields on natural language processing and
artificial intelligence. I found this use of Perma.cc to be risky. In the end, all of the Perma.cc links were
removed, but had we gone to press with the Perma.cc links, would AALL be subject to takedown notices
under § 512(d)(3) because it publishes its journal electronically on its website (and by doing so becomes a
service provider under § 512(d))? In connection with takedown notices, would the electronic journal be
required to appoint a designated agent for receipt of such notices?231 Furthermore, regardless of
answering takedown notices, would AALL Law Library Journal be responsible for the actual or red flag
knowledge232 of its editors that by linking to archived copies of other journal articles and book chapters
they were, in fact,233 linking to infringing copyrighted articles, and hence unable to find shelter under §
512 (d) due to (d)(1)(A) and (B)? Would they be responsible under a theory of contributory infringement
for controlling the editing process that added the links and for profiting from journal subscriptions
without shelter under § 512 due to (d)(2)? All of this is untested in court and speculative, but I am
describing risks that find their basis in existing law and in plausible and occurrent facts.
Assuming law libraries and other registrars lack cover under § 512 (for instance, if courts find
that registrars are not service providers), they may need to address caselaw doctrines of vicarious liability,
contributory infringement, and even willful blindness.234 Without § 512(m), it will be harder to argue
they have not duty to monitor, or that monitoring by libraries does not trigger liability as a kind of control
under vicarious liability or knowledge under contributory infringement. Even the staple doctrine of
“substantial non-infringing uses” is not of much use because web material is copied while such content is
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still available on the chance that someday it might be unavailable, at least at its original location. This is
not exactly the “time-shifting” or authorized use justifying the doctrinal defense Sony v. Universal City
Studios.235 It is time-shifting on the contingency that someday the Perma.cc-linked material might one
day not be available. The specter of Polygram raises its head,236 with the possibility of courts assigning
risk to those who failed to regulate usage of copyrighted works. This lack of solid protection under Sony
should concern end users and registrars alike.
E.

Frustration with § 512 and the CASE Act

Copyright owners are quite discontented with DMCA takedown system237 and want, and may get,
reforms. As of this writing, bills known as the “CASE Act” 238 was amalgamated into the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021.239 The legislation sets up a small claims board for copyright infringement.
The purpose of the CASE Act is to “ensure[] that copyright interests without high expected damages have
some mode of enforceability so that individual creators, ‘many of whom rely upon the promise of
exclusive rights associated with the grant of copyright to earn a living and provide for their families[,] . . .
have a realistic ability to enforce those rights when they have a comparatively modest claim for
damages.’”240 The CASE Act might spawn many more claims to be brought for infringing content in web
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See supra notes 48 through 49 and accompanying text.
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See Polygram In.t'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. June 20, 1994). See
also supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2019, H.R. 2426, 116th Cong. (2019) and
Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2019, S. 1273, 116th Cong. (2019).
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See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. (2020) (enacted),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/133/. Chapter 15-Copyright Small Claims of the Act,
including §§ 1501-1511 covers the creation, claims and procedures for a Copyright Claims Board. The point is that
future amendment of current law may make suits against Perma.cc, its registrars, and end users more cost effective
for plaintiffs.
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H. REP. NO. 116-152, at19 (2019) (citing Letter from Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, to Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights and Director, U.S. Copyright Office (Oct. 11, 2011),
included in U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Small Claims: A Report of the Register of Copyrights (2013),
https://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/usco-smallcopyrightclaims.pdf). Apparently, the ABA supports the
legislation, which will help “small creators.”
On the one hand, you have the notice and takedown process that can be inefficient, cumbersome,
and, as many small creators will tell you, often pointless. On the other hand, there is the Article III Federal
court system that can be expensive, time-consuming, and often out of reach for many working-class and
middle-class creators.
For instance, the average cost of litigating an infringement case in Federal court is approximately
$350,000, but the total amount of damages that can be awarded, for instance, in a CASE Act-eligible matter
cannot exceed $30,000. In that instance, the cost of litigating a case could be more than 10 times the
damages that are at issue.
According to a survey by the American Bar Association, which supports this legislation, most
lawyers will not take infringement cases with damages at or lower than $30,000. As a result, many
petitioners are functionally unable to vindicate their rights under law. In other words, these creators are
given a right without a remedy.
The CASE Act will provide a viable alternative. This legislation would establish a voluntary
forum for small copyright claims housed within the Copyright Office. Disputes would be heard by a new
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archives because the cost of litigation would be significantly less. However, under § 1506(aa) of the Act,
libraries and archives may, without charge and following Register of Copyright regulations, elect not to
participate in proceedings before the Board.241 Claims against federal and state agencies are also
excluded.242 Participation is voluntary, and rights to pursue claims in other forum are preserved.243 Total
damages are limited to $30,000 (exclusive of attorney’s fees).244 Certainly, the adoption of this Act is
worth considering for those participating as Perma.cc registrars because it lowers the economic hurdles to
suit while at the same time granting legal procedures for exclusion for libraries and archives.245 This may
stimulate reform of practices and policies pertaining to Perma.cc.

VI.
Factors Registrars and End Users Might Want to Consider to Protect Themselves
from Copyright Liability
Because we may not apply § 512(c) with any certainty to protect registrars, and because they are
contractually bound to indemnify Perma.cc for liability from use by their end users of the system,
thoughtful consideration of policy and practices for administering Perma.cc usage among law journals,
faculty and students is imperative.
The most important step is to convey the sense of responsibility for copyright compliance that
students, librarians and faculty have in the use of Perma.cc. Even if an academic law library does not
subscribe to Perma.cc, its law reviews and journals may wish to publish works of authors who use them.
Consequently, there is a need for broad discussion on this topic throughout the profession. Whether there
should be wholesale prescriptive ban on classes of works is another question. Indeed, it might be easier to
start with what is safe--federal government websites and documents, and instances where the end user has
gotten permission. However, for anyone who has ever asked for it, permission is difficult, time
consuming, and will subject publications with Perma.cc links to delay (that is probably why Perma.cc
does not insist upon it). Such a policy would significantly hamper the utility of Perma.cc as a service.
Essentially, users or registrars need to complete a fair use analysis to fully evaluate compliance with
copyright law246—not something that should lightly be entrusted to the disparate members of an
organization, including student editors, when the registrar may be liable on theories of contributory
infringement or indirect liability (or under Perma.cc’s indemnification clause). On the other hand, the
specter of infringement may result in little more than a takedown notice, which library registrars may
entity called the Copyright Claims Board made up of intellectual property experts with experience
representing both creators and the users of copyrighted material.
165 Cong. Rec. H8352 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2019) (statement of Rep. Hakeem Jeffries),
https://www.congress.gov/116/crec/2019/10/22/CREC-2019-10-22-house.pdf.
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See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. (2020), Title II, Subtitle A, §
1506(aa) (enacted), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/133/.
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However, a successful claim brought against Perma.cc for infringement may trigger indemnification obligations for
a law library of a state university. See supra section I.A.1.
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deem an acceptable risk. However, this is an odd position for law libraries to take—we will accept
infringement because the risk is only a rare takedown notice. This seems to be at odds with what should
be our fundamental values and the message we should convey to student editors. Assuming a library
wanted to avoid infringement (and attendant risks, rare though they may be), then for the sake of a few
bright line rules to ensure copyright compliance, whole categories of materials, for instance web blogs,
news sites, movies, academic articles and audio/visual materials might be delegated to preservation in
Perma.cc’s private setting. On the other hand, electing private archiving diminishes the value of
Perma.cc for scholars.
Library registrars should determine if the role of Perma.cc citations in footnotes is to provide
complete access to all readers to web materials or is it to affirm that the law review (or author) has done
its job in verifying the content cited, and consequently privately archiving the item on Perma.cc is
enough. At least that way, journal editors or authors could verify the accuracy of a citation.247 Anyone
wishing to access the cited content in its entirety would have to check subscription databases or archives
for the material. Some material may just not be made available to the public, and it may have to be
enough to know that it was once accessed by editors and authors to verify a proposition—something
journals may continue to do by accessing a web material archived under a private setting.
In the final analysis, some might return to point to the efficacy of the notice-and-takedown system
of § 512(c)(1)(C) as the ultimate barrier between registrars and liability and as the reality of the risks
associated with using Perma.cc. But as pointed out in a previous section,248 it is Perma.cc that fits
squarely within this section—not registrars or end users. Nonetheless, to preserve the argument that
§512(c) protects them, registrars may want to preemptively deal with infringing content by switching
links to it to the private archival setting. Alternatively, § 512(d), pertaining to links may apply (especially
to online journals). To preserve protections under that subparagraph, registrars need to plan to deal with
infringing content. Indeed, § 512(i) obliges internet service providers to adopt and notify end users of
certain policies, including cancelation of accounts for abuse.249 Online journals using Perma.cc may also
need to provide notice of a designated agent for takedown notice (perhaps the same as Perma.cc’s).250
Finally, future legislation may make suits against Perma.cc or its registrars more plausible.251

VII.

Conclusion

When I commenced writing this article, I presumed that, despite an obligation to objectivity, as a
librarian and law professor, my own inclinations would be to justify preservation activities of Perma.cc
and its network of mostly library registrars to stop linkrot. However, I now wonder whether the scholarly
footnote’s function (even in using Perma.cc) is simply limited to supporting scholarly propositions, a task
which can be done by checking citations, and in most cases, preserving only private versions of web
content in Perma.cc archives. I realize this may run counter to our basic instincts as librarians and
scholars—to provide access and to document the ever-shifting sands of materials on the Web.
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Without Congressional mandate to do so—without amending 17. U.S.C. § 108 to permit libraries
and archives to capture that which they do not own252—I have come to believe that we need to respect,
however small or even uncontested, the rights of the Web’s diverse copyright owners absent their
permission to do otherwise. In general, there is no clear path to fair use in Perma.cc’s application to web
material253—and in particular there is no transformative use.254 It is not just a question of risk (which
right now appears to be slight) and escaping liability. It is about recognizing that current law provides no
cover for Perma.cc archiving outside of works in the public domain and authorized uses. Certainly, I
would approve of changes in the law to support archiving of web materials, but a proper limiting principle
(so that all copying in the name of archiving is not fair use) is elusive. I also encourage technological
advances that would permit users of Perma.cc to select just the portion they need to support a scholarly
proposition or argument—for instance, selective screen capture.
Because legislation, like the CASE Act, as a part of the Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2021, 255
makes it easier authors and creators to sue instead of simply issuing takedown requests, libraries and
archives need to become with yet-to-be promulgated regulations of the Registrar of Copyrights exempting
them from jurisdiction under the Act. However, even with such an exemption, there is dissonance
between online archiving practices and copyright law.
Unfortunately, I probably have reached what will be an unpopular conclusion in the community
of my respected colleagues, but fortunately I have not uncovered huge copyright risk, but a fundamental
lack of accord between copyright law and online archiving, as in the instance of Perma.cc.
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Although I cannot document it, as Chair of the Copyright Committee of the American Association of
Law Libraries in 2005-2006, I participated in a Copyright Office sponsored round table to discuss amendment of §
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industries, who wanted concessions of their own--that for-profit libraries no longer receive the benefits of § 108.
Ultimately, no progress was made. Certainly, some will point to the continued success of the Internet Archive in
archival efforts to prove such changes turned out to be unnecessary, but I am more skeptical. See supra notes 84
through 86 and accompanying text.
In 2011, the Copyright Office produced a report which remarked that “Section 108 exception does not
contemplate mass digitization.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LEGAL ISSUES IN MASS DIGITIZATION: A PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 19-20 (Oct. 2011),
https://www.copyright.gov/docs/massdigitization/USCOMassDigitization_October2011.pdf. The context, however,
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